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ABSTRACT

In this Article, the Author challenges the definition of the
term "state"that is commonly accepted in legal scholarship as
the basis for assessing whether an entity is a subject of
internationallaw. By analyzing a number of cases that do not
fit into the "traditional" model-including the Holy See,
Napoleon, and the Confederacy-the Author reaches the
conclusion that the only essential element of a subject of
internationallaw is its sovereignty. An entity is sovereign when
it is able effectively to assert that it is not subordinate to another
authority: territory and population are therefore not essential
attributes of internationalpersonality. The Author also explores
the close relationshipbetween the status of an entity as a subject
of international law and international responsibility. The
conclusions and analytical approaches employed in the Article
are applicable to the study of entities long considered "lesser"
subjects than states, such as intergovernmental organizations,
insurgents, or belligerents, and even to the analysis of
contemporary terroristnetworks such as al-Qaeda.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The idea that states are the primary subjects of international
law stems from the fact that they appear to constitute the most
complete type of subject, having a more or less stable authority over a
generally well-defined territory and population. Arguably, this cannot
be said for entities such as international organizations, which
generally lack a territorial basis, or of belligerents, which are not
deemed to possess the quality of a stable authority.
This Article aims to challenge the idea that since states are the
primary subjects of international law,1 they are qualitatively different

1.
Practically all scholars dealing with the issue of subjects of international
law hold this view. See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 58 (6th ed. 2003); DOMINIQUE CARREAU, DROIT INTERNATIONAL §§ 813-816 (7th ed.
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from other subjects of international law. If proved, this proposition
would entail that non-state actors have, in principle, the same rights
and obligations as states under customary international law. 2 The
fundamental consequence would be the need to rethink the way in
which the international community regards non-state actors.
Part II of this Article first addresses the most common definition
of "state" under international law. It also identifies a number of
borderline cases in which subjects of international law not falling
within that definition raise interesting questions as to the propriety
of using this definition in deciding whether a certain entity is a
subject of international law. These cases, although admittedly few,
are assumed to be representative of a larger number of similar
instances. Although these instances vary greatly in nature, they all
point to the same conclusion. Also, they are gathered from different
time periods, because the assumption is that the fundamental rules of
international law relating to the personality and identity of subjects
have not changed during the past centuries.
Part III of this Article then proposes a more general definition of
subjects of international law, a definition capable of easing the
incongruities raised by the examples discussed in Part II. In
particular, it suggests that for an entity to be considered a subject of
international law, the entity must be able to assert effectively that it
is not subordinate to another authority; in other words, it must have
the ability not to recognize any entity as a superior. Such a
status-defined as sovereignty 3-is established through the analysis of
that entity's powers within the entity itself and, under certain
circumstances, of its relations with other subjects of international
law.
Part IV of the Article explores the real basis for this definition
and puts forward the view that a close link exists between theories of
2001); GEORG DAHM ET AL., 1 VOLKERRECHT 125 (1989); LOUIS HENKIN ET AL.,
STARKE'S
INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 241 (3rd ed. 1993);
INTERNATIONAL LAW 85 (I.A. Shearer ed., 11th ed. 1994); JOE VERHOEVEN, DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 49-50 (2000); Colin Warbrick, States and Recognition in

InternationalLaw, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 205 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2003).
See, e.g., CARREAU, supra note 1, § 816. In fact, "[t]he monolithic view of
2.
statehood upon which traditional international law doctrine depends significantly
limits the scope of international law. One consequence is that it establishes a model
for full international personality that other claimants for international status cannot
replicate." HILLARY CHARLESWORTH & CHRISTINE M. CHINKIN, THE BOUNDARIES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 125 (2000).

3.
Although virtually every definition of the term "sovereignty" has been
challenged, its use as a synonym of "independence" to explain the "Grundnorm" of
international relations has been dominant at least since the end of the eighteenth
century. See, e.g., St~phane Beaulac, Emer de Vattel and the Externalization of
Sovereignty, 5 J. HIST. INT'L L. 237, 286-92 (2003). The fact that sovereignty is a
complex concept, pervaded by political and other considerations, is also suggested in
James Rosenau, Sovereignty in a Thrbulent World, in BEYOND WESTPHALIA? STATE

SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL
Mastanduno eds., 1995).

INTERVENTION

191 (Gene Lyons

& Michael

348

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 38.345

personality under international law, on the one hand, and
international responsibility, on the other. Finally, the conclusions in
Part V address the potential significance of the application of the
findings presented in the previous parts to cases that do not
apparently harmonize with the traditional view of international
subjects.

II.

STATE ACTORS?

A. Attempting to Define "State"
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations explains: "Under
international law, a state is an entity that has a defined territory and
a permanent population, under the control of its own government,
and that engages in, or has the capacity to engage in, formal relations
with other such entities."4 This definition is fundamentally consistent
with the one contained in the Montevideo Convention on the Rights
and Duties of States, which provides that "[t]he State as a person of
international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a
permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d)
capacity to enter into relations with the other States ''5 and is referred
to by scholars, especially in the United States, as indicative of
customary international law. 6 The aforementioned elements are often
defined "requirements" or "essential conditions" for an entity to be
7
regarded as a state under international law.
This definition is not satisfactory. First, part of the definition
requires that the entities with which a state engages in formal
relations be states themselves. But because they can only be states if
they are able to have relations with other such entities, a vicious
circle seems unavoidable. It seems difficult to characterize the
capacity to engage in formal relations as an essential element, if only

4.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 201 (1987).

5.
Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, art. 1, 165
L.N.T.S. 19, reprinted in 28 AM. J. INT'L L. 75 (Supp. 1934) [hereinafter Montevideo
Convention].
6.
See Thomas D. Grant, Defining Statehood: the Montevideo Convention and
Its Discontents, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 403, 405-22, 435-47 (1999) (explaining
different definitions of state and the insufficiencies of the definition enshrined in the
Montevideo Convention).
7.
See, e.g., HENKIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 246; Christian Tomuschat,
InternationalLaw: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a New Century, in
281 HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW COLLECTED COURSES 9, 96 (1999); see

also I.I. LUKASCHIUK, MEZHDUNARODNOE PRAVO 293 (1999) (evidencing that Soviet
and Russian legal literature identifies these three elements as "making up" the state).
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because this would entail the need to pre-define whether the other
entities are already states.
The Comment to the Restatement further cautions that, although
the definition is generally accepted, "each of its elements may present
significant problems in unusual situations. '8 If a definition is
generally accepted, but each of its elements is put into doubt in
borderline situations, the solution would be to look for a better
definition, not to try to force unusual situations to conform to the
legal definition. 9 Uncommon situations test the veracity and
reliability of the definition itself, at least if the definition is to serve
any practical purpose. 10
Also, the definition does not place enough emphasis on the
element of "external" sovereignty. The expression "under the control
of its own government" in the Restatement may admittedly refer to
this requirement, but it is insufficient to identify properly this
feature. In fact, federated states may be said to rule a defined
territory and population, and some of them are allowed to enter into
relations with other subjects-in certain cases even with other
subjects of international law. They are not, however, states within the
meaning of international law. In the case of federated states, it is
their lack of independence with regard to the federal state that
prevents them from being considered subjects of international law.
This is the case, for example, for the states and territories of the
United States, 11 or the republics making up the former Soviet Union
until 1991. The latter is especially interesting because,
notwithstanding the fact that Byelorussia (now Belarus) and the
Ukraine were among the founding members of the United
Nations-an organization that is open only to "states" pursuant to a
joint reading of articles 3 and 4 of its Charter-none of the republics
constituting the U.S.S.R. was a state within the meaning of
12
international law.

8.
9.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 201 cmt. a (1987).
See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 217 (5th ed. 2003) (stating

that "whether or not the entities discussed above constitute international persons or
indeed states or merely part of some other international person is a matter for careful
consideration in the light of the circumstances of the case... ").
Such as including some entities within the category and excluding others.
10.
11.
In United States v. Belmont, the U.S. Supreme Court applied this rule of
international law, stating that "the external powers of the United States are to be
exercised without regard to state laws or policies .... In respect of all international
negotiations and compacts, and in respect of our foreign relations generally, state lines
disappear." 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937).
See BRUNO SIMMA, THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS - A
12.
COMMENTARY 156 (1994). It has been suggested by local scholars that the two Soviet
republics indeed did play a certain role in international relations thanks to their
membership in various U.N. bodies. See Svetlana Svilas, Istoriografia i istochniki po
istorii vneshnepoliticheskoj deiatelnosti BSSR v 1954-1990 gg., 2003(4) BELARUSSIAN
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 40. The example of
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It is therefore difficult to accept the Restatement's definition of a
"state" under international law. But it will be assumed that this
definition describes what a state in the sense of international law
looks like. Throughout this Article, this description of the state will
be identified as the "traditional" way to address the problem of
statehood in international law-this being the view widely held in the
past decades, especially among U.S. scholars.
B. Recognition
Before introducing the cases, a short explanation of the
phenomenon of recognition is also necessary. "Recognition of
governments" denotes the act through which it becomes apparent
that a subject of international law is willing to enter into certain
relations with another authority. 13 Many states today assert that
they do not intend explicitly to recognize governments. 14 "Recognition
of states" is the act through which a subject of international law
indicates its willingness to enter into inter-state relations with
another subject of international law and thus is evidence-but not
15
proof-that the latter has acquired international personality.
Recognition may be explicit-through an official statement issued by
the recognizing authority-or, more often, implicit-through some
other act presupposing recognition that the other entity is a subject of
16
international law.
There are two fundamental reasons why recognition may not
establish the international personality of states and other subjects.
First, the principle of the sovereign equality of the subjects of
international law would be infringed by the possibility that one or
more subjects could deny the existence of another subject by refusing
to recognize it.
Second, it is illogical-and ultimately impractical-to allow an
entity to be considered a subject of international law by some subjects
but not by others. Since, for example, it is common that a newly
Byelorussia and the Ukraine as founding members of the United Nations is
particularly curious in view of the letter dated February 10, 1945 by Franklin D.
Roosevelt, President of the United States, to Joseph V. Stalin, Secretary-General of the
U.S.S.R. Communist Party, suggesting that the U.S. should also be given two
additional votes in the General Assembly. Stalin apparently assented to this view, but
the United States did not pursue the matter further. The letter by Stalin, with
reference to the previous correspondence, is reprinted in EDWARD R. STETTINIUS, JR.,
ROOSEVELT AND THE RUSSIANS 283 (Walter Johnson ed., 1949).
13.

STEFAN TALMON, RECOGNITION OF GOVERNMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

269 (Ian Brownlie ed., 1998).
14.
Id. at 3-5.
15.
See, e.g., ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 48-49 (2001); MARIO
GIULIANO ET AL., DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE (PARTE GENERALE) 84-96 (1991).

16.
at 84-96.

See, e.g., CASSESE, supra note 15, at 48-49; GIULIANO ET AL., supra note 15,
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created state is not immediately recognized as a state by the
international community as a whole, the absurd result would follow
that an effective and independent government over a population and
a territory would be considered a state by some subjects, but as nonexistent-within the international realm-by others. It is not clear
with which rules of customary international law an entity lacking
unanimous recognition would be bound to comply. 17 This means that
an independent authority, existing as a matter of fact,' 8 is thereafter
recognized by other subjects wishing to enter into some kind of
intercourse with it; such recognition, however, has no bearing on the
fact that this subject already exists and is part of the so-called
"international community." Independence as the essential attribute of
all subjects of international law-a topic further analyzed in this
Article-also demonstrates that recognition is not a requirement for a
state to be a subject of international law. 19
In 1991, the European Community issued "guidelines" for the
recognition of republics aspiring to independence during the process
of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in the early

17.
See CASSESE, supra note 15, at 48-49; GIULIANO ET AL., supra note 15, at
84-96; see also HANS KELSEN, DAS PROBLEM DER SOUVERANITAT UND DIE THEORIE DES
VOLKERRECHTS ch. 8 (1920).
In Russian Reinsurance Co. v. Stoddard,the court stated:
18.
The fall of one governmental establishment and the substitution of another
governmental establishment which actually governs; which is able to enforce
its claims by military force and is obeyed by the people over whom it rules,
must profoundly affect all the acts and duties, all the relations of those who live
within the territory over which the new establishment exercises rule. Its rule
may be without lawful foundation; but lawful or unlawful, its existence is a fact
and that fact cannot be destroyed by juridical concepts.
240 N.Y. 149, 158 (N.Y. 1925).
19.
It is sometimes suggested that, for example, Member States of the
European Union are not fully sovereign in that decisions of organs such as the
European Commission or the European Court of Justice have supremacy and direct
See, e.g., Michael P. Scharf, Earned Sovereignty:
effect within their territories.
JuridicalUnderpinnings, 31 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POLy 373, 376-77 (2003). But because
a state has given its consent to be bound by treaties or by decisions of other subjects of
international law and can withdraw its consent, it remains a subject of international
law regardless of these self-imposed limitations. The power of these organs is a mere
product of an agreement between states: the authority of the organization's acts
derives from the founding treaty. See Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, Dualism Revisited.
International Law and Interindividual Law, 86 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE
909, 998 (2003) [hereinafter Arangio-Ruiz, Dualism Revisited]. In fact, the principle
nemo plus iuris transferre potest quam ipse habet and its corollaries have been
recognized since the Wimbledon Case, when the Permanent Court of International
Justice stated that "[n]o doubt any convention creating an obligation . . . places a
But the right of
restriction upon the exercise of the sovereign rights of the State ....
entering into international engagements is an attribute of State sovereignty." S.S.
Wimbledon (Gr. Brit., Fr., Italy, Japan, Pol. v. F.R.G.), 1923 P.C.I.J. 25 (ser. A) No. 1
(Aug. 17).
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1990s. 20 Contrary to commonly held belief, 21 these guidelines do not
show a novel approach, but rather follow the long-standing practice of
trying to impose specific obligations on new subjects. To mention only
one example, following the Bolshevik revolution in Russia in 1921,
the French Minister of Foreign Affairs declared that
Le gouvernment franvais n'a pas l'intention de reconnaitre le pouvoir
des soviets tant que celui-ci n'aura pas donn6 des garanties de sa
volont6 de se conformer au droit des gens et de respecter les
engagements et les obligations des Gouvernments russes qui ront
22
pr~c~d6 Al'Agard des gouvernments et des particuliers 6trangers.

Whether or not the proponents of such statements actually
abided by them, the purported aim appears to be the same: setting
standards for governments to be recognized within the "family of the
nations. ''23 But these kinds of declarations by (older) members of the
international community imply that the new entities are already

20.
The Declaration on Yugoslavia was issued at the Extraordinary Ministerial
Meeting held on December 16, 1991, in Brussels.
See European Community:
Declaration on Yugoslavia and on the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States,
Dec. 16, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 1485. It contained the Guidelines on the Recognition of New
States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union, where EC Member States agreed to
recognise, subject to the normal standards of international practice and the
political realities in each case, those new states which, following the historic
changes in the region, have constituted themselves on a democratic basis, have
accepted the appropriate international obligations and have committed
themselves in good faith to a peaceful process and to negotiations.
Id.
21.
See, e.g., Diane F. Orentlicher, Separation Anxiety: InternationalResponses
to Ethno-Separatist Claims, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 66 n.374 (1998); Marc Weller,
Current Development: the International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 86 AM J. INT'L L. 569, 587-88 (1992). But see Martii
Koskenniemi, The Place of Law in Collective Security, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 455, 490 n.54
(1996) (suggesting that this approach to the recognition of states constitutes a
"resuscitated" approach).
22.
Answer by the representative of the French Government during a
parliamentarydebate, 5 January 1921, in ALEXANDRE CHARLES Kiss, 2 R9PERTOIRE DE
LA PRATIQUE FRANCAISE EN MATI9RE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 385 (1966).
23.
The same applies to decisions of "non-recognition" by the United Nations.
See, e.g., Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970),
1971 I.C.J. 16, 58 (June 21) (holding that U.N. Member States must "recognise the
illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia" and refrain from acts implying
recognition of the South African government's authority over that territory). This
decision, not based on general international law but binding only Member States of the
United Nations under article 25 of the U.N. Charter implies that, pursuant to the
principle pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt, absent the Security Council's binding
statement, states would retain their freedom to recognize or not.
See Legal
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 2004
I.C.J. 131 (July 9) (separate opinion of Judge Higgins), available at http://www.icjcij.org; SIMMA, supra note 12, at 407-09, 416.
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subjects of international law. No state would ask entities that are not
already subjects of international law to undertake international legal
obligations. An entity has certain rights and obligations only because
it already is a subject; others may wish to force compliance under the
threat of non-recognition from a political standpoint, and therefore
isolation, but this stand does not, and may not, affect the legal
personality of those new entities. 24 To hold the contrary, one would
need to argue that an entity lacking the quality of a subject of
international law-and not enjoying the rights and duties
thereof-acquires that status by starting to comply with the legal
obligations of a subject, which it still is not. Such reasoning leads to
the absurd result that an entity would only become a subject of
international law when it finally complies with those duties, and its
conduct is finally acknowledged by others (a process that might take
considerable time).
Similarly, continued recognition of entities that have ceased to
fulfill the requirement of effectiveness and independence shows that
sometimes recognition is not based on any consistent set of empirical
criteria, but rather on the acceptability of that entity "to current
international mythologies of legitimate statehood. '2 5 This is another
reason not to assign excessive importance to recognitions.
C. Atypical Quasi-StateActors?
A first critique of the traditional model of the international
community relies on the acknowledgement that there are certain
actors of international law that are treated like states (and are even
sometimes defined as states), although they do not meet all the
criteria that are traditionally deemed necessary for them to be called
states. The following pages contain an analysis of various such cases.
1. The Holy See
"When I request an audience from the Vatican, I do not go to see
the King of Vatican City, but the head of the Catholic Church. ' 26 This
statement by Dag Hammarskjbld, Secretary-General of the United
Nations between 1953 and 1961, describes the paradox of the

In this Article, the terms "subject" and "actor" of international law are used
24.
as synonyms. But see Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Sur les Rapports entre Sujets et "Acteurs"
en Droit International Contemporain, in MAN'S INHUMANITY TO MAN: ESSAYS ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOUR OF ANTONIO CASSESE 261 (Lal Chand Vohrah et al.
eds., 2003).
CHRISTOPHER S. CLAPHAM, AFRICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM: THE
25.
POLITICS OF STATE SURVIVAL 14 (1996) (emphasis omitted).
EDWARD GRATSCH, THE HOLY SEE AND THE UNITED NATIONS 1945-1995 10
26.
(1997).
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relationship among the Holy See, the Vatican, and the Catholic
Church. The Roman Pontiff, supreme head of the Catholic Church,
has occupied a position of high political authority since the Middle
Ages and, through the vicissitudes leading to the end of the
"universal" rule of the Holy Roman Empire and the gradual formation
of a community of sovereign entities, has acquired a status equal to
27
that of a head of state.
Part of the confusion stems from the fact that the Pontiff has, for
most of the existence of the Holy See, ruled the Papal States situated
in central Italy. Only for a certain period after 1808, and then again
between 1870 and 1929, did the Pontiff have no jurisdiction over any
territory at all. 28 Following the signature of the Lateran Treaty, the
Pontiff now rules the Vatican City. 29 But these changes in territorial
control (or lack thereof) have not affected in any sense the
international personality of the Holy See. After the conquest of the
Papal States by Napoleon in 1808, a concordat-a real international
agreement between sovereign subjects 30-was signed by Napoleon and
the Pope, ensuring the exercise of the activities of the Pontiff "in the
same forms of his precedessors," as well as the right to receive and
appoint ambassadors. 31 Even after the conquest of Rome by the

th

On this issue, see the decision issued by the Italian Court of Cassation, 5
27.
section (penal), on July 17, 1987 in the case In re Marcinkus et al., 1988 RIVISTA DI
DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 216. According to the court:

[O]f no importance, for the purpose of this decision, is the examination of the
causes, of the reasons and of the historical origins of the present position of the
Holy See, within the international legal order ....
The only determining and
relevant issue to evaluate is, in this matter, its undisputed and undisputable
nature of subject of international law.
Id. (translated by author).
28.

See 2 J.H.W. VERZIJL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

295-97 (1969).
29.
See Treaty of the Lateran, Feb. 11, 1929, Italy-Vatican City, O.V.T.S. 161,
Europ T.S. No. 590019, reprinted in 23 AM. J. INT'L L. 187 (Supp. 1929) [hereinafter
Lateran Treaty]. Article 2 of the Lateran Treaty provides, "Italy recognises the
sovereignty of the Holy See in international matters as an inherent attribute in
conformity with its traditions and the requirements of its mission to the world," and
article 3 states, "Italy recognises the full ownership, exclusive dominion, and sovereign
authority and jurisdiction of the Holy See over the Vatican as at present constituted,
together with all its appurtenances and endowments, thus creating the Vatican City,
for the special purposes and under the conditions hereinafter referred to." Id.
30.
Concordats are international treaties relating to the status of the Roman
church and its ministers and to matters of cult within the territory of the states with
which they are concluded, and they are therefore distinguishable on grounds of their
content, not of their nature. See Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, On the Nature of the
InternationalPersonality of the Holy See, 1996 REVUE BELGE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
354, 365.

31.
Concordat of Fontainebleau of January 25, 1813, 5 Martens Recueil des
Trait6s 552 (Supp. I).
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Italian state in 1870, the Holy See continued to maintain its activities
and relations with other subjects of international law as if nothing
32
had changed.
The Holy See is currently party to various conventions, including
the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
34
33
in Armies in the Field of 1864, the Geneva Conventions of 1949,
3
the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989, 5 and the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations. 36 The Holy See is a member of
the World Intellectual Property Organization, 37 a member of the
International Atomic Energy Agency, 38 and has the status of the only
'39
"Non-member State Permanent Observer to the United Nations.
These facts show that, regardless of the doctrinal differences and
theories, the Holy See-though not a state under the definition of the

32.

See the ruling by the Italian Court of Cassation, 11" section (civil) of

December 3, 1988, (reprinted in ALBERTO MIELE, 2 LA COMUNITA' INTERNAZIONALE (I
SOGGETTI) 67 (2000)), holding that "the Holy See has survived as a subject of

international law to the extinction of the Pontifical state due to debellatio, occurred in
1870 as a consequence of the annexation of Rome by the Italian state" (translated by
author). See also Josef Kunz, The Status of the Holy See in InternationalLaw, 46 AM.
J. INT'L L. 308, 312 (1952) (noting that during the period 1870-1929, the Pope acted as
an international mediator between Germany and Spain and as an arbiter between
Haiti and Santo Domingo; during the First World War, the Holy See had vessels with
its own flag declared neutral in the hostilities).
33.
For the original French text of the Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field of 1864, see 129 Consol. T. S. 361, 362.
For the status of ratifications, see http://www.icrc.org (last visited Nov. 2004).
34.
For the text of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, see 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 85, 135,
287. For the status of ratifications, see http://www.icrc.org (last visited Nov. 2004).
35.
For the text of the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989, see 28
I.L.M. 1448. For the status of ratifications, see http://www.icrc.org (last visited Nov.
2004). The United States of America and Somalia are the only countries that have not
ratified the Convention.
36.
For text of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, see 500
U.N.T.S. 95. It was already at the Congress of Vienna of 1815 that the "R~glement on
the Precedence of Diplomatic Agents" was drafted, which "n'apportera aucune
innovation relativement aux Repr6sentants du Pape." See 64 Consol. T.S. 2.
37.
For the text of the Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property
Organization, see 828 U.N.T.S. 3.
For the members of the organization, see
http://www.wipo.int (last visited Nov. 2004).
38.
For the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, see 276
U.N.T.S. 3 and subsequent amendments. For the members of the organization, see
http://www.iaea.org (last visited Nov. 2004).
39.
See http://www.un.org/Overview/missions.htm#nperm (last visited in Nov.
2004). On July 1, 2004, the U.N. General Assembly expanded the possibilities of
participation in the organization by the Holy See; the Holy See is now allowed to
participate in the Assembly's general debate (after the last member on the list), to
respond to speeches made during debates, to circulate its communications directly as
official documents of the organization, to co-sponsor draft resolutions, and to raise a
"point of order" during committee meetings. See G.A. Res. 314, U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. AIRES/58/314 (2004).
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considered, in essence, an equal to
Montevideo Convention-is
40

states-par interpares.
The Holy See is the government of the Church and, de facto, also
of the minuscule city of the Vatican; there is no reason to create
complex theories on the relationship among these three bodies. The
Vatican City lacks independence and is an entity governed by the
Holy See: it is therefore not a subject of international law. It is true
that, on some occasions, the Holy See prefers to deal with certain
matters of its own through the Vatican state. 4 1 But if one is to go
beyond mere appearances, it is evident that the real subject on the
international plane is the Holy See, which effectively controls the
Vatican City (a mere territorial administration) and the Catholic
Church (the world-wide network of persons and institutions). An
example clarifies this apparent confusion. In 1993, the Holy See and
Israel signed a treaty which, in addition to mutual recognition and
the establishment of diplomatic relations, relates to the regime of the
Catholic Church on Israeli territory, 42 Article 1.2 of the treaty states
"[tihe Holy See . . . affirms the Catholic Church's commitment to
uphold the human right to freedom of religion and conscience, as set
forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in other
'43
international instruments to which it [the Holy See] is a party.
Thus, the parties agreed that the Holy See was the subject of
international law capable of assuming binding obligations on behalf
of the Catholic Church.
The Holy See, in sum, is a subject of international law equal to
states, even if it does not possess the traditional elements of
statehood. It is the same subject as the Holy See before 1808, the
same subject as that which existed between the fall of Napoleon and
1870, and the same subject as that which existed between 1870 and
1929. Changes in territory and population have not affected its
nature as a sovereign subject. 44 Currently, the expression "Holy See"

See Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Decision on Defence
40.
Motion to Obtain Cooperation from the Vatican Pursuant to Article 28 (Trial Chamber
I, I.C.T.R. 2004) (treating the Vatican as a sovereign state, over which the Charter of
the United Nations, and the Statute of the Tribunal, does not-may not-impose
obligations). Although the reference in the decision is to the Vatican state, the request
regarded cooperation by the "former Ambassador of the Holy See to Rwanda," and it is
apparent that "Holy See" and "Vatican" are used by the Trial Chamber as
interchangeable terms. For the text of the Decision, see http://www.ictr.org (last visited
Nov. 2004).
This seems the case of treaties having specific territorial application. See
41.
HENKIN ETAL., supra note 1, at 299.
Fundamental Agreement Between the Holy See and the State of Israel,
42.
Dec. 30, 1993, Vatican-Isr., 33 I.L.M. 153 (1994).
43.
Id. at 154.
44.
A similar analysis applies to the less famous case of the Sovereign Order of
Malta.

See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 171 (4th ed. 1997). For example,
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is used to define the government of the Vatican. Should the Holy See
once again lose its territorial basis, however, it would still remain a
subject of international law in its own right.
2. The Boers
One case of an entity subject to international law that moved
from one territory to another-and therefore cannot be said to have
possessed "a stable territory"-is exemplified by the "Great Trek" of
the Boers in the first half of the nineteenth century. 45 The Cape of
Good Hope was settled by the Dutch in 1652 and, with some minor
interruptions stemming from colonial conflicts, remained a Dutch
dependency until 1806.46 Movements of Boer farmers from the Dutch
Colony of the Cape to the North were common throughout the
eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries. It was,
however, after the cession of the colony to Great Britain in 1814, and
especially after the abolition of slavery in 1833, that almost the entire
47
African-Dutch community moved to form the Free State of Orange,
the African-Dutch Republic, 48 and the Colony of Natal. 49 Those
settlers, according to the traditional view, would not have been able
unilaterally to discard their bond of allegiance to the British Crown in
accordance with domestic (British) rules. 50 Had this been a simple
occupation of terra nullius, the new territory would automatically
have become part of the British Empire. But the emigrants intended
to reestablish their colony on an independent basis, with the
privileges and liberties the new British sovereign denied them
(including that of being a slave-owner).

the Order of Malta was invited to the Geneva Conference of 1929, convened under the
auspices of the Red Cross on the prisoners of war; it was not invited to the Universal
Postal Union Conference of 1937. See PAUL GUGGENHEIM, Rt9PERTOIRE SUISSE DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC: DOCUMENTATION CONCERNANT LA PRACTIQUE DE LA
CONFEDtRATION EN MATItRE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC, 1914-1939 498-99
(1975); see also CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 152 (Martin Dixon &

Robert McCorquodale eds., 4th ed. 2003) (quoting an Italian judgment on the status of
the Order of Malta).
45.
See J. Westlake, L'Angleterre et la Rdpublique Sud-Africaine, 28 REVUE DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET DE LEGISLATION COMPARtE 268, 269-72 (1896).
46.
15 (2000).

JOHN DUGARD, INTERNATIONAL LAw - A SOUTH AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE 14-

47.
See Westlake, supra note 45 (noting that this entity maintained its external
independence until 1881 when the Pretoria Convention made it a British protectorate).
48.
Later, this entity became the Republic of South Africa and was annexed by
Great Britain as Transvaal in 1877. Id.; see also JOHN NIXON, THE COMPLETE STORY
OF THE TRANSVAAL 12-21 (1885).

49.
Natal was annexed by the British government at the Cape in 1843. NIXON,
supra note 48, at 19. See generally M. J. De Louter, L'annexion du Transvaal, 13
REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET DE LEGISLATION COMPAREE 194 (1881).
50.
See VERZIJL, supra note 28, at 65.
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Leaving aside any moral judgment on the Boers' aims, 51 there is
no doubt that other countries recognized these entities as subjects of
international law because they effectively discharged state functions
in their respective territories until their final annexation by Great
Britain. In fact, the domination by the Netherlands through its East
India Company was a nominal one, allowing for a high degree of de
facto self-government.5 2 When British rule replaced the nominal
Dutch authority, it was simply not recognized by the local ruling class
of Dutch origin. 53 The manifesto describing the intentions of the
emigrants, drafted in 1837, is clear in this respect, stating that "we
are resolved, wherever we go, that we will uphold the first principles
of liberty" and that "we quit this colony under the full assurance that
the English Government has nothing more to require of us, and will
allow us to govern ourselves without interferencesin the future. '54 The
Boers believed that they "were an oppressed nation under foreign
supremacy." 55 As such, they moved to another territory to retain their
own identity. The British government recognized that the Transvaal
'56
was constituted by the "emigrant farmers beyond the Vaal river.
In this case, the nation (or rather, the white governing elite)
moved with its property (including slaves) to an altogether different
territory, maintaining an identity recognized by Great Britain and
other nations. The government-with its legal system and constitutive
rules-and the population changed location, but both kept their
identity. In response to this reasoning, it might be said that because
the Boers were colonists under Dutch rule, they could not be an entity
under international law before the Great Trek; therefore, it is
impossible to define their migration as a modification of the territory
of a subject of international law. The better view, however, is that
Dutch rule was more formal than effective and that subsequent
history demonstrates that the Boers left in order to maintain the
integrity of their traditions and institutions. Moreover, when the Boer
entities formed after the Great Trek ahead of the still-advancing
British presence, they began to withdraw beyond the river Vaal. In

See Tamara Rice Lave, Note, A Nation at Prayer, a Nation in Hate:
51.
Apartheid in South Africa, 30 STAN. J. INT'L L. 483, 486-91 (1994) (analyzing the roots
of South African apartheid policies).
52.

See NIXON, supra note 48, at 14.

53.
Id.
The Dutch-speaking group in South Africa actually also includes
descendants of French Huguenots and Germans. See FRANK CANA, SOUTH AFRICA FROM THE GREAT TREK TO THE UNION 5-23 (1909); T.R.H. DAVENPORT, SOUTH AFRICA:
A MODERN HISTORY 6-8 (4th ed. 1991).

54.

DAVENPORT, supra note 53, at 16-17.

55.
56.

Id. at 18.
See NIXON, supra note 48, at 339-41.
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this instance, a real migration of an internationally constituted
57
entity, exercising effective authority over its subjects, took place.
The foregoing case shows that "the total change of territory by a
people which, under the same government and law, settles in a
different territory, leaves the identity of the state [or of the subject]
58
intact."
3. Czechoslovakia
Czechoslovakia, as a subject of international law, was born
without any territorial basis and practically without a population, but
it developed into a state without losing its identity. The Czechoslovak
Republic had its genesis in the Czechoslovak National Council that
acted, during the First World War, as a representative of the
Czechoslovak nation. 59 Under the Council, a 30,000-strong
Czechoslovak army fought the Great War against the Austrian
60
Empire and its allies on different fronts.
These two entities were considered by the Allied Powers
(Entente) as the legitimate representatives of the Czechoslovak
people. The British Foreign Office heavily financed the recruiting
operations of this army; it stated that "[s]ince the beginning of the
war, the Czecho-Slovak nation has resisted the common enemy by
every means in its power .... In consideration of its efforts to achieve
independence Great Britain regards the Czecho-Slovaks as an allied
nation." 61 From October 24, 1917 onward, Italy recognized the
Council as a Czechoslovak government well before any authority on
the territory of Czechoslovakia had been secured. 62 On April 21, 1918,
Italy and the National Council signed a Convention mentioning the
existence of a sole and autonomous Czechoslovak army under the
authority of the National Council; 63 on June 30, 1918, a Convention
between Italy and the National Council envisaged the direct
execution of the laws passed by the latter within the Italian kingdom
and stated that the Czech military was under the jurisdiction of

57.
For an analysis of this issue, see DONATO DONATI, STATO E TERRITORIO 3334 (1924).
The author also provides an interesting study of the theoretical
qualifications of "nomadic States." Id. at 28-3 1.
58.
Joseph L. Kunz, Identity of States in InternationalLaw, 49 AM. J. INT'L L.
68, 72 (1955).
59.

See JOSEF KALVODA, THE GENESIS OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA 180-206 (1996).

60.

Id.

61.

Diplomatic Note of Aug. 9, 1918, in 1 GREAT BRITAIN AND THE LAW OF

NATIONS 236 (Herbert Smith ed., 1932). Note the sheer difference with the declaration
on the Polish National Committee in London of October 15, 1917, which only stated
"His Majesty's Government are very willing to recognise this official Polish
organisation." Id. at 235.
62.
KALVODA, supra note 59, at 259.
63.
See MIELE, supra note 32, at 54.
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Czech court-martials. 64 A Czechoslovak government in exile was
established in Paris only later65 and recognized by several nations,
66
including France, Serbia, Belgium, Greece, and Italy.
The expressions of recognition of the National Council and of the
government in exile could be construed as the expression of the
political will to recognize an entity representing one of the
nationalities within the Austro-Hungarian Empire fighting against
the empire itself-that is, a politically motivated recognition to a
military group as a way of persuading it to join the war effort. But
when one considers these recognitions together with events unfolding
after the end of the Great War, another explanation appears more
6 7
likely. The peace treaties of Saint Germain-en-Laye (with Austria)
and Trianon (with Hungary)68 list Czechoslovakia among the winning
"Allied and Associated Powers." To be among the victorious states,
the subject called "Czechoslovakia" must have already been in
existence before the end of the war and the dissolution of the AustroHungarian Empire. But there is no doubt that, at least before
November 3, 1918, the date of the armistice of Villa Giusti between
the Empire and Italy (the last official act of Emperor Karl), 69 neither
the National Committee nor the "government in exile" enjoyed
effective control over any portion of the territory of what would
become Czechoslovakia.
The only logical explanation is that a subject of international law
(an ally of the Entente) existed before the dissolution of the Empire
and was able to engage in international relations with other subjects;
when the war ended, that same subject was finally able to acquire a
territorial basis. The late acquisition of territory by this (already
existing) international subject, however, did not modify its nature
and its "essence," for it was considered the same subject which had
fought as an "Allied and Associated Power. '70 No other national group

64.
Supplementary Convention between the Italian Government and the
Czechoslovak National Council of June 30, 1918, reprinted in MIELE, supra note 32, at
106-07.
65.
On these events, see Antoine Hobza, La Rdpublique Tchdcoslovaque et le
droit international, 29 REVUE GNERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 385-409

(1922).
66.

TALMON, supra note 13, at 287.

67.
Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria,
Sept. 10, 1919, Consol. T.S. 8, 4 U.K.T.S. 103, reprinted in 14 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (Supp.
1920).

68.
Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Hungary,
and Protocol and Declaration, June 4, 1920, reprinted in 15 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (Supp.
1921).
69.
See KRYSTYNA MAREK, IDENTITY AND CONTINUITY OF STATES IN PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 203 (2d ed. 1968).

70.
According to the High Administrative Tribunal of Czechoslovakia, and
therefore on the basis of that country's domestic legal order, Czechoslovakia was in
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or liberation committee was recognized among the "Allied and
Associated Powers" in the same treaties. In this case, a subject of
international law, par inter pares, existed before it was able to
exercise effective authority over any territory; when it did acquire
this ability, it continued to exist according to its new situation
without any essential modification of its personality and identity.
The last three cases suggest that entities without a stable
territory or population (or both) are not necessarily different from
states. In fact, all these subjects retained their own identity as
subjects of international law, with the rights and duties flowing from
this position, both in times when they enjoyed effective control over a
territory and in times when they were forced by circumstances to
survive on some other state's territory-as if in a sort of "artificial
lung" that kept them alive (Holy See, Sovereign Order of Malta) 7 1 or
even assisted them at their birth (Czechoslovakia). In cases of what
at the time was regarded as occupation of terra nullius (Boers), the
transfer of the organized population to an altogether new territory
did not alter the personality of the subject.
4. Spain and Turkey
In addition to the above-mentioned cases, in which subjects of
international law regarded as equal to states (or, in certain cases,
regarded as states proper) do not possess all the attributes set out in
the classical definition of the Restatement, there are cases of
subjects-insurgents or belligerents 72-developing into states or being
attributed rights and duties typical of states.
There are different views on the legal evaluation of the events
surrounding the Spanish Civil War, dating from July 17, 1936 to
March 28, 1939. 73 According to the standard account, the lawfully
elected Republican government was replaced by the Nationalist one
at least by March 28, 1939, when troops led by General Franco
existence since October 28, 1918, the date of the proclamation of independence by the
National Committee, and therefore before the dissolution of the Empire (November
1918) and the peace treaties recognizing its sovereignty (signed in 1919 and 1920). See
Establishment of Czechoslovak State, 3 I.L.R. 13, 14 (Sup. Admin. Ct. of Czech Rep.
1925). This judgment does not exclude the possibility that the subject of international
law existed even before October 28, 1918, although without the forms typical of a state.
71.
For this image, see Arangio-Ruiz, On the Nature of the International
Personality of the Holy See, supra note 30, at 365.
See Eibe Riedel, Recognition of Belligerency and Recognition of Insurgency,
72.
in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 167-73 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed.,
1997) (providing definitions of insurgency and belligerency); see also BROWNLIE, supra
note 1, at 63 (noting that insurgents and belligerents are both considered subjects
entitled to enter into legal relations on the international plane); SHAW, supra note 9, at
219-20, 1040-41 (observing that the concepts of insurgency and belligerency are not
easily distinguishable).
73.
See generally James W. Garner, Questions of International Law in the
Spanish Civil War, 31 AM. J. INT'L L. 66 (1937).
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entered Madrid. At that point (although the exact time is subject to
debate), Nationalist insurgents somehow became an organ of the
Spanish state, which did not cease to exist. The Republican
government, representing "Spain" until March 27, is said to have
disappeared, leaving the territory and population (of Spain) under the
rule of Franco. How exactly an entity (the insurgent community under
Franco) had become an organ of another entity (Spain, the state it
was fighting until March 27) is a mystery. How the Republican
government of Spain, being an essential element of the state of Spain
according to the definition of "state" provided for in the Restatement,
could disappear but, at the same time, "leave in inheritance" the
"state of Spain" to the next government is an even greater mystery.
on
effective
attention
our
focus
we
however,
If,
authorities-governments-rather than on "states," the matter can be
interpreted in an altogether different light. As time passed and the
Nationalist government gained ground through force (aided by Italian
and German interventions), its sphere of effective jurisdiction
expanded with every victory in the field; conversely, the Republican
government (Spain) saw its authority diminished as far as control
over territory was concerned. These entities were not qualitatively
different one from the other. For this reason, the international
level,
community saw them as belligerents, qualitatively on the same
74
and consequently applied the rules of warfare and neutrality.
Both governments ruled their respective territory with effective
authority and engaged in international intercourse. Many of the
diplomats of "Spain" before 1936 joined the Franco regime and
became "ministers" or charges d'affaires to other countries. 75 An
example of this is provided by the disputes regarding the gold of the
Spanish National Bank. In 1931, the Spanish National Bank had
deposited a large amount of gold with the French National Bank.
This gold was requested, after the beginning of the civil war, both by
the Nationalist and by the Republican governments, each of which
had, by that time, its own "Spanish National Bank."
Each government deemed itself entitled to the whole sum as the
representative of "Spain." The problem was that, according to French
or international law, there was no rule to decide which entity was

74.

See also ROBERT HODGSON, SPAIN RESURGENT 74-99 (1953).

Hodgson's

analysis of the policy of non-intervention in the Spanish Civil War, especially by Great
Britain, albeit appallingly biased in favor of the Franco regime, provides a large
amount of useful information on the general attitude of diplomatic circles toward the
two belligerents.
75.

See MARINA CASANOVA, LA DIPLOMACIA ESPANOLA DURANTE LA GUERRA CIVIL

241-53 (1996) (providing a list of diplomats who joined the Franco regime). Casanova's
book is extremely interesting especially with respect to the "parallel" diplomacy that
ensued after the beginning of the Civil War and the necessity of the Republic to acquire
weapons in the battle for its own survival. See id. at 27-35, 161-93.
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"Spain"; the French judiciary therefore refused to take a stand on the
issue. 76 The decision was finally taken by the French government, on
a purely political level, to recognize the Franco regime on February
27, 1939. 77 Similarly, in June 1938, the British Government
expressed its view that
His Majesty's Government recognizes the Nationalist Government as a
Government which at present exercises de facto administrative control
over the larger portion of Spain [and] effective administrative control
[T]he Nationalist
over all the Basque Provinces of Spain ....
Government is not a Government subordinate to any other Government
7
in Spain. 8

Courts generally abided by this view, stating that there were two
sovereigns in Spain, albeit one de facto (Nationalist) and one de jure
(Republican); no substantial difference seemed to exist on the legal
level between the two characterizations. In an action before a
Norwegian court by a charg6 d'affaires of the Nationalist government
to hold and dispose of the property of the former ambassador to
Norway, the plaintiff claimed that the Court should have decided "for
itself whether or not the necessary conditions have been fulfilled in
order that that Government must be recognized as exercising a lawful
authority over Spain or a part thereof. '79 The District Court,
however, referred to the executive branch of Norway and declared
that "[a]s long as there exists a Spanish State and Government
recognized by the Norwegian authorities, the right to possess and
dispose of effects of such State . . . belongs to the representative of

such State." The Supreme Court followed this reasoning.80 Although

76.
See Georges Scelle, La guerre civile espagnole et le droit de gens - L'or de la
banque d'Espagne, 45 REVUE GtNtRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 649 (1938).
MIELE, supra note 32, at 20-21.
77.
In re Arantzazu Mendi, [1939] A.C. 256 (H.L. 1939) reprintedin 9 I.L.R. 60,
78.
61-62. The House of Lords unanimously interpreted these statements as implying that
the Nationalist government, "for the purposes of international law," was "a foreign
sovereign State." The extension of the two states' territories, and their modifications,
was regarded as immaterial. See id. at 66. In addition, the English Court of Appeals
held in Banco de Bilbao v. Sancha and Rey, 9 I.L.R. 75, 77 (1987), that the decrees of
the de jure government had no effect in the territory of the de facto one in. More
recently, this approach was followed by the Queen's Bench Division (Commercial
Court) in Sierra Leone Telecommunications Co. Ltd. v. Barclays Bank, [1998] 2 All E.R.
821, 822 (Q.B. 1998), in which the Court sided with the U.K. government and refused
to recognize the military junta in control of Freetown, the capital of Sierra Leone, as
the "Government of Sierra Leone." Interestingly, the Special Court for Sierra Leoneset up jointly by the U.N. and the Sierra Leone Government for crimes committed
during the civil war in that country after November 30, 1996-rested on that very
ruling to find that it had jurisdiction in Prosecutor v. Callon, No. SCSL-2004-14AR72E,
72-79 (decision on constitutionality and lack of jurisdiction of March 13,
2004), available at http://www.sc-sl.org (last visited Nov. 2004).
See Campuzano v. Spanish Government, 11 I.L.R. 68, 69 (Sup. Ct. of
79.
Norway 1938).
Id. at 71.
80.
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this conclusion seems at odds with the previously cited French one, it
is actually based on the same logic-i.e., that the executive is allowed
to make decisions in this area of international relations because there
is no strict legal provision a tribunal can apply to decide which
government represents a certain state during a civil war-unless one
of the two governments intends not to gain ultimate control over the
whole territory, but merely to secede. 81 German courts predictably
took the opposite view-that the Nationalist government was the de
jure one, while the Republic should be regarded as an insurgent,
8 2
exercising de facto authority on Catalonia and other regions.
Recognition, too, could not solve the issue decisively. The
different examples of competing recognitions by a different group of
states only show that recognition is merely a political choice, with no
effective bearing on the qualification of an entity as a subject of
international law. In fact, the Republican government-in-exile was
recognized as the only legitimate Spanish government by Yugoslavia
and Mexico until March 1977, when democracy was restored to the
83
country.
A case analogous to Spain, contrary to the opinion of most
scholars, is that of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic
after the First World War, which involved two subjects of
international law confronting each other. These were the Ottoman
Empire, which had declared and lost the war alongside Germany and
the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the Kemalist Republic, which was
born out of a group of nationalist insurgents to become present-day
84
Turkey.
Domestic decisions related to recognition of other governments
are not able to deny international status to the new entity seeking
power and recognition. They merely intend to reaffirm that one
subject of international law wishes to keep conducting business as
usual with the other subject-be it the Republican Government of
Spain, the Ottoman Empire, or the Government of Sierra Leone.
Some countries leave this appreciation entirely in the hands of the
executive branch of the government, while others allow courts to
85
make this determination.

81.
See discussion infra Part II.C.5.
82.
See In re Spanish Republican Government (Security for Costs), 9 I.L.R. 73
(Ct. App. of Germany 1938).
83.
See TALMON, supra note 13, at 298.
84.
See Enrico Zamuner, Le Rapport entre Empire ottoman et Rdpublique
turque face au droit international, 6 J.

HIST. INT'L L. 209 (2004) (detailing the

underlying history of the relevant events and providing a demonstration in law of the
existence of two different subjects in that instance).
85.
BROWNLIE, supra note 1, at 95-96.
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5. The Confederate States of America
Similar to the examples above is the case of insurgents or
belligerents not succeeding in their efforts, as long as their control
over (a portion of) the territory is effective and they are able to
engage in affairs both inside and outside their borders. The
Confederacy created by those states seceding from the United States
of America in 1861 is a prime example. In that case, seven seceding
states created a Constitution to form a new subject. The secession
and all following acts were based on the premise that the states
composing the Union were "Free and Independent States [with] full
Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish
Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things which Independent
States may of right do. ''8 6 The position of the Confederates was that
the U.S. Constitution always speaks of states, though united through
87
a compact, as separate entities.
During the years of war, the Confederate States of America
(CSA) strove to reach the political objective of official recognition by
other countries-notably France, Great Britain, and Mexico.8 8 The
fact that the CSA never succeeded in reaching this aim did not
preclude it 89 from engaging in international interaction.9" The only

86.

THE

DECLARATION

OF

INDEPENDENCE

(U.S.

1776),

available

at

http://www.ushistory.org/declaration/document. For a discussion of this topic from a
Confederate perspective, see JEFFERSON DAVIS, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE
CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 70-73, 126-30 (1881).
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 ("no Person holding any Office of Profit
87.
or Trust under them") (emphasis added); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 ("[tlhe judicial Power
shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws
of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
authority") (emphasis added); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1 ("[t]reason against the
United States, shall consist only in levying War against them") (emphasis added). It is
noted in U.S. Supreme Court decisions that there is no consistency concerning whether
the United States of America should be addressed in the singular or in the plural.
Compare Heckers v. Fowlers, 69 U.S. 123, 128 (1864) ("[w]here the United States are
plaintiffs"), and In re Henderson's Distilled Spirits, 81 U.S. 44, 58 (1871) ("the United
States are entitled to judgement"), and Dow v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 158, 175 (1879) ("the
United States are plaintiffs or petitioners"), with Davidson Bros. Marble Co. v. United
States, 213 U.S. 10, 17 (1909) ("a suit in which the United States is plaintiff"), and
United States v. Shaw, 60 S. Ct. 659, 663 (1940) ("when the United States is plaintiff').
Common English language has accepted that the United States "is," although other
languages have chosen a different path. Among others, German, French, Italian, Greek
all refer to the "Unites States of America" with plural verbal forms.
See generally FRANK LAWRENCE OWSELY, KING COTTON DIPLOMACY 88.
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA 318-577 (1931).
89.
Although the confederated states saw themselves as a plurality of sovereign
subjects, I am using the singular form to address them because, in its international
relations,the Confederacy was clearly deemed by its own participants as one entity.
90.
A compelling case in this respect is made by the historical analysis in
FREDERIK GRAHAM WINN, A STUDY OF THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN FRANCE
AND THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA 6-9, 30-33, 95-98 (1958).
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reason recognition was not granted was fear of U.S. reprisal. 91 If the
view is accepted that recognition is not constitutive of international
subjects, the lack of recognition does not as such have any bearing on
the conclusion reached with respect to the international personality of
the CSA. In this respect, U.S. Secretary of State Seward instructed
the U.S. ambassador to London that should Great Britain recognize
the Confederacy, he was to communicate to the British government
"promptly and without reserve that all negotiations for treaties of
'92
whatever kind between the two governments will be discontinued.
According to this statement, the United States was not going to act
through a countermeasure, which would have been allowed under
international law had the act of recognition of the CSA been
considered a breach of international law, but through a mere act of
retortion, aimed at adversely affecting British interests but not
British rights under international law. 93 Thus, even the United
States did not consider recognition of the CSA illegal under
international law, but just an act of overt unfriendliness toward it.
The most important countries of the time declared themselves
neutral in the war, thus accepting that both belligerents were on an
equal footing and had the same rights and duties regarding the laws
of warfare. 94 The declaration of neutrality by Great Britain 95 is
especially important, since it gave rise to a series of legal disputes
between Great Britain and the United States; most of these disputes
(the so-called Alabama claims) were later to be solved by a joint
96
Tribunal of Arbitration.
The United States wished to portray the Confederates as rebels
and the war as a mere domestic disturbance. According to this line of
reasoning, the U.S. government never officially declared war, never

91.

See 1 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 103-05

(1906) (reprinting the Circulars of Mr. Black (Feb. 28, 1861) and Mr. Seward (Mar. 9,
1861), U.S. Secretaries of State, addressed to U.S. diplomatic envoys abroad). The
circulars state that recognition of the Confederacy would amount to disturbance of the
"friendly relations, diplomatic and commercial, now existing between those powers and
the United States." Id. No mention of breaches of international obligation is made.
92.
Id. at 106.
93.
See Peter Malanczuk, Countermeasures and Self-Defence as Circumstances
Precluding Wrongfulness in the InternationalLaw Commission's Draft Articles on State
Responsibility, in UNITED NATIONS CODIFICATION OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 197, 207

(Marina Spinedi & Bruno Simma eds., 1987) (writing that "retortion is an unfriendly
act against another State with the object to persuade that State to end its harmful
conduct").
94.
95.

See 10 VERZIJL, supra note 28, at 115.
See ARNOLD DUNCAN McNAIR, INTERNATIONAL

LAw

OPINIONS 146-47

(1956).
96.
For the history of the arbitration, see JOHN BASSETT MOORE, HISTORY AND
DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN

A PARTY 496-97 (1898); 10 VERZIJL, supra note 28, at 118.
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recognized the Confederacy as a sovereign state, and deemed the
soldiers fighting under Confederate colors traitors or pirates when
assaulting U.S. vessels. This position, however, belied the facts.
President Lincoln ordered measures in the manner of a blockade 97 to
counter the CSA's bid for survival. U.S. courts tried Confederate
soldiers accused of treason or piracy but often failed to enter
convictions.9" The U.S. Supreme Court recognized that in
determining whether the United States could condemn the property
of rebels, the right to condemn enemy property during war was an
accepted practice under internationallaw.99 The U.S. Supreme Court
also acknowledged that promissory notes in Confederate money were
enforceable in U.S. courts after the war' 00 and that investments in
Confederate bonds were lawful. 01'
The Confederacy was a subject of international law with all the
rights and duties pertaining to a state.'0 2 Although it was not
officially recognized as a state, it acted as the paramount authority
over the territories it held, and the population thereon; it engaged in
international interaction with other subjects; it was considered a
lawful belligerent party. "The insurgent community therefore
possessed a government established as formally as is possible in a
society the separate political existence of which is not
acknowledged."' 1 3 Judge Grier, writing for the majority in the Prize
Cases remarked that "[this] is no loose, unorganized insurrection,
having no defined boundary or possession. It has a boundary marked
by lines of bayonets, and which can be crossed only by force-south of

See the discussion on the meaning of this formulation in the judgment and
97.
dissenting opinion of The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635, 665-71, 682-85 (1862).
98.
See Susan Poser & Elizabeth Varon, United States v. Steinmetz: The Legal
Legacy of the Civil War, Revisited, 46 ALA. L. REV. 725, 744-50 (1995).
99.
Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. 268, 306-07 (1870). No need to refer to
international law would have existed had the Supreme Court considered the matter a
mere question of U.S. domestic law.
100.
Thorington v. Smith, 75 U.S. 1 (1868), cited in Aboitiz & Co. v. Prince, 99 F.
Supp. 602 (D.C. Utah 1951) (applying this principle to an armed conflict of
international character).
101.
Baldy v. Hunter, 171 U.S. 388, 400 (1898).
102.
See also Mauran v. Alliance Ins. Co., 73 U.S. 1, 14 (1867). Justice Nelson
wrote that "the so-called Confederate States were in the possession of many of the
highest attributes of government, sufficiently so to be regardedas the ruling or supreme
power of the country... " Id. (emphasis added). In fact,
[w]hen [a rebellion] has become a recognised war those who are engaged in it
are to be regarded as enemies. And they are not the less such because they are
also rebels. They are equally well designated as rebels or enemies. Regarded as
descriptio personarum, the words "rebels" and "enemies," in such a state of
things, are synonymous.
Miller, 78 U.S. at 309.
103.

WILLIAM EDWARD HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 44 (1924).
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this line is enemy's territory, because it is held in possession by an
10 4
organized, hostile and belligerent power."'
This is not to say that the secession by the Confederate states
was legal under the U.S. legal system 10 5 or under international law at
the time, nor that it might be considered lawful under current
understandings of the self-determination principles enshrined in the
U.N. Charter and supporting documents. In particular, the position of
the U.S. government and Supreme Court-that, according to the U.S.
Constitution, the seceding states had never actually seceded-has no
direct relation to the question of the international personality of the
Confederacy. 10 6 The issue of the existence of a separate international
subject has no direct relation with the legality of its conduct under
domestic or international law; on the contrary, the analysis of its
possibly unlawful acts presupposes its existence as a distinct entity.
If the Confederacy had not been a subject of international law, no
possible discourse on violations of international law by that entity
would be conceivable.
As stated in the preceding pages, the creation and death of states
in the sense of international law is a question of fact-and, de facto,
the CSA acted as the governing body over a defined territory for over
four years, just as the original thirteen colonies had done, more
successfully, after they effectively rejected the lawfully constituted
07
government of the British Crown.

104.
See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635, 673-74 (1862).
105.
The situation, according to U.S. domestic law, was in fact no different from
the one of the thirteen colonies in their struggle against British rule under (British)
constitutional law or, for that matter, of the seceding states of Slovenia, Croatia,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia according to the constitutional law of the
former Yugoslavia. In particular, see the arguments suggesting the illegality of the
secession of the Yugoslav republics in the early 1990s, according to Yugoslav
constitutional law, by ROBERT M. HAYDEN, BLUEPRINTS FOR A HOUSE DIVIDED - THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LOGIC OF THE YUGOSLAV CONFLICTS 30-52 (2002).

106.
See Keith v. Clark, 97 U.S. 454, 461 (1878) (stating that "the State [of
Tennessee] remained a State of the Union. She never escaped the obligations of that
Constitution, though for a while she may have evaded their enforcement.")
107.
EDWARD S. MORGAN, THE BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC 1763-1789 58-64 (1956).
King George III, in his speech before the British Parliament on October 26, 1775, found
that "[rebels in America] have raised Troops, and are collecting a Naval Force; they
have seized the public Revenue, and assumed to themselves Legislative, Executive, and
Judicial Powers, which they already exercise in the most arbitrary Manner over the
Persons and Properties of their Fellow Subjects." See Merrill Jensen, American
Colonial Documents to 1776, in 9 ENGLISH HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS 851 (David C.
Douglas ed., 1955). This declaration is a recognition of a state of fact existing in the
thirteen colonies, against which the British government had to take extraordinary
steps; the situation had reached the stage of an insurgency. The fact that the thirteen
colonies had become de facto independent at least during 1775 or 1776 was later
confirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Ware v. Hylton, in which the Court stated:
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Evidence of the state-like status of the Confederacy is also
provided by recent U.S. judicial rulings that considered it a
predecessor of the United States.1 08 In the Steinmetz case, the United
States accepted that rights and duties flowed from the CSA as they
would have from a conquered state and espoused the view that the
United States is a successor state in respect of the Confederacy;
therefore, the CSA must have been a subject of international law
entitled to wage war, to own military property, and to be a
predecessor with respect to public property.
6. China and Taiwan
The case of Taiwan, also known as the Republic of China (ROC),
demonstrates the uncertainties of the Restatement's definition of
"state"; the Comment appended to paragraph 201 and the Reporters'
Notes indeed make reference to Taiwan and its status under
international law.' 0 9 A brief historical analysis of the events leading
to the present situation may help shed some light on the actual
situation.
In 1683, the Ch'ing dynasty ruling mainland China annexed the
1 10
In
island to its empire, incorporating it into the province of Fukien.
1886 the island of Formosa (Taiwan) formally became a province of

This abolition of the Old Government, and this establishment of a new one was
the highest act of power, that any people can exercise. From the moment the
people of Virginia exercised this power, all dependence on, and connection with
Great Britain absolutely and forever ceased; and no formal declaration of
Independence was necessary....
3 U.S. 199, 223 (1797).
United States v. Steinmetz, 973 F.2d 212 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507
108.
U.S. 984 (1993). In fact, a program of military naval building was envisaged by the
Confederacy among the actions taken to wage the war. Since the blockade declared
and effectively put in place by the U.S. prevented the CSA from building its own
warships in local ports, the Confederate government took steps to have the ships built
in European ports as commercial vessels and then to outfit them on the high seas. One
such ship, the Alabama, was sunk in 1864 by the U.S. Navy; its bell was recovered
some seventy years later and ended up in the shop of an antiques' dealer, Mr.
Steinmetz. The U.S. government successfully claimed title on the premise that the
U.S. is the successor of the CSA under international law by relying on United States v.
Huckabee, in which the Supreme Court stated:
[I]f the nation is entirely subdued, or in case it be destroyed and ceases to exist
...[the rights of the conqueror] are no longer limited to mere occupation of
what he has taken into his actual possession, but they extend to all the
property and rights of the conquered state....
83 U.S. 414, 434-45 (1873) (emphasis added).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 201, cmt. F, reporters' n.8
109.
(1987).
Jonathan I. Charney & J.R.V. Prescott, Resolving Cross-Strait Relations
110.
between China and Taiwan, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 453, 454-56 (2000).
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China.' 1 ' After Japan defeated China in 1895, Taiwan was ceded to
Japan "in perpetuity" under the Treaty of Shimonoseki' 1 2 and
remained under Japanese sovereignty until the Second World War.
The Chinese imperial government was overthrown in 1911; the
new (republican) government was recognized by the United States,
Japan, Russia, Great Britain, and other states in the following
years.1 1 3 But its legitimacy in parts of the territory purportedly under
its authority was challenged by a number of local warlords well into
114
the 1920s.
During the Second World War, both the Cairo Declaration of
1943115 and the Potsdam Declaration of 1945116 stated that Chinese
sovereignty should be restored over all the territories taken by Japan,
including Taiwan. The Chinese government, a founding member of
the United Nations, was therefore recognized as the same
international subject that had relinquished its authority over Taiwan
in 1895.
With Japan's surrender in 1945,117 the Supreme Allied
Command invited Chinese armed forces to Taiwan with the aim of
enabling the Chinese government to regain possession of the island.
Chinese administration attempted to assume control on October 3,
1945 as a military government under an Administrator-General and
Concurrently Supreme Commander for Taiwan Province. Between
September 2, 1945118 and October 3, 1945, the island was neither
governed by Japan nor effectively controlled by China." 9 After

111.
SIMONG LONG, TAIWAN: CHINA'S LAST FRONTIER 1-23 (1991).
112.
Treaty of Peace, Apr. 17, 1895, China-Japan, 181 Consol. T. S. 217.
113.
See JEROME ALAN COHEN & HUNG DAH CHIU, PEOPLE'S CHINA AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 207 (1974).
114.
See generally Tarcisio Gazzini, Some International Legal Aspects of the
Chinese Civil War (1927-1949), 1 J. ARMED CONFLICT L. 141 (1996) (providing a brief
and clear account of the Chinese Civil War and its consequences on the identity of the
ROC).
115.
Final Text of the Communiqu6, Dec. 1, 1943, 3 Bevans 858, 1943 FOREIGN
RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE CONFERENCES AT CAIRO AND
TEHRAN 448.
116.
Proclamation by the Heads of Governments, United States, China and
United Kingdom, July 26, 8, 3 Bevans 1204, 1945 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES, 2 THE CONFERENCE OF BERLIN (THE POTSDAM
CONFERENCE) 1474.
117.
Surrender by Japan, Terms Between the United States of America and the
Other Allied Powers and Japan, Sept. 2, 1945, 59 Stat. 1733, E. A. S. No. 493.
118.
September 2, 1945 was the date of the unconditional surrender of Japan to
the Allied forces. The Act of surrender contained the obligation "for the Emperor, the
Japanese Government and their successors to carry out the provisions of the Potsdam
Declaration in good faith." Id. This instrument shows that the Potsdam Declaration
provisions regarding Japan were considered legally binding on the parties to the Act of
Surrender (including, among others, the United States, China, and Japan).
119.
The Act of Surrender of Japanese Forces in China reads:
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October 3, 1945, some authority on the island was vested in the
Chinese government under the Guomindang party, although it is by
no means clear whether this government was sovereign or, rather,
120
was acting under the mandate of the Allied Supreme Command.
The matter is complicated by the fact that, at least by 1949, two
different governments openly struggled to be recognized as the
Chinese government. 12 1 This fact, together with the political clout
created by the confrontation between the communist and the
capitalist "fields" since the late 1940s, has puzzled international
scholars, with a few exceptions, 122 up to the present day.
The debate on this issue has generally concerned the right (or
duty) to recognize each of the two governments, as well as the
diplomatic, political, and economic relations between members of the
international community and each of the two subjects. 12 3 The debate
does not
is also tainted by strong political considerations, and it 124
subject.
either
of
identity
the
on
answer
legal
a
clear
provide
The Emperor of Japan, the Japanese government and the Japanese Imperial
General Headquarters, having recognized the complete military defeat of the
Japanese military forces by the Allied forces and having surrendered
unconditionally to the Supreme Commander for the Allied powers, having
directed by his general order no.1 that the senior commanders and all ground,
sea, air and auxiliary forces within China excluding Manchuria,Formosa and
French Indo-China north of 16 degrees north latitude shall surrender to
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek....
Act of Surrender of Japanese Forces in China, Sept. 9, 1945, available at
http://www.taiwandocuments.org/japansurrender.htm (last visited Nov. 2004).
120.
General Chiang Kai-shek recognized that he was to accept the surrender of
all Japanese forces within China (excluding Manchuria), Formosa, and French IndoChina north of 16 degrees north latitude in compliance with the General Order issued
by the President of the United States on behalf of the Allied Powers to General
MacArthur, and not of his own authority. See WOODBURN KIRBY, THE WAR AGAINST
JAPAN 283 (1969). Later, the Treaty of Peace between the Republic of China and Japan
provided that "[i]t is recognised that under [the multilateral Peace treaty of 1951]
Japan has renounced all rights, title and claim to Taiwan (Formosa)." Treaty of Peace
between the Republic of China and Japan, Apr. 28, 1952, 138 U.N.T.S. 3, 38. The fact
that a treaty recognizes the loss of sovereignty of one state over a portion of its
territory does not indicate that this succession actually took place on the date of the
entering into force of the treaty itself, however. Succession is "the replacement of one
State by another in the authority over a territory." See Vienna Convention on
Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts, Apr. 7, 1983, 22
I.L.M. 306, 308 (1983). Therefore, effective substitution of authority must occur before
succession actually takes place.
121.
The PRC was established in 1949, but Guomindang forces have had
effective control over Taiwan since at least 1947, when they put down a rebellion by the
indigenous Taiwanese people. See Parris Chang & Kok-ui Lim, Taiwan's Case for
United Nations Membership, 1 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 393, 413 (1996).
See Gazzini, supra note 114. The following legal explanation of the civil
122.
war between Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek relies on Gazzini's analysis.
123.
See, e.g., Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Taiwan Relations Act After Ten Years,
3 J. CHINESE L. 157 (1989).
One example of this is provided by discussions in U.S. legal and diplomatic
124.
circles on the recognition of Communist China during the 1950s and 1960s. See
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The civil war between the Communist forces under the
leadership of Mao Zedong and the Nationalist forces under Chiang
Kai-shek started in 1927.125 At least from 1931, two different subjects
of international law existed on the territory of today's "mainland
China." One was the Chinese government (usually called
"Nationalist," or Guomindang from the name of its ruling party at the
time), which exercised effective authority over a large, though slowly
shrinking, portion of mainland China. The other was the Communist
entity, increasingly asserting its authority over portions conquered
from the Nationalist government. 12 6 In 1949, the Nationalist
government escaped to Taiwan, and hostilities between the two
subjects effectively came to an end. That event did not affect in any
way the identity of the two contenders.
As far as the Communist People's Republic of China (PRC) as a
subject of international law is concerned, different theses have been
proposed. The most widely accepted seems to be that the movement
led by Mao Zedong, a mere insurgent before 1949, became a successor
government to China and then changed the nation's name to the
PRC. After some years of uncertainty, so the argument goes, the
United Nations acknowledged the situation by accepting the PRC as
the sole Chinese representative in the organization, and practically
all of the states that had previously rejected this position gradually
accepted it. Thus, the argument links membership in international
organizations, and in particular the permanent seat in the U.N.
Security Council, not only to the issue of statehood in general, but
also to the identity of the PRC and ROC as subjects of international
law.
The incongruities deriving from this formulation are significant.
First, as it was pointed out above, it is not clear how an
insurgent-which is a subject itself-may turn into a mere organ of
another subject. Second, the Republic of China did not disappear after
Mao Zedong took power in mainland China. It is difficult to conceive
how an insurgent becomes an organ of the very state against which it
has fought and which the insurgent has forced to migrate to a
different territory.
Third, and more important, the PRC and the ROC govern
separate territories, do not recognize any other subject as superior,
generally ROBERT P. NEWMAN, RECOGNITION OF COMMUNIST CHINA? 104-241 (1961)
(exploring a variety of political issues underlying the choices in favor and against
recognition). See also Lung-chu Chen & W.M. Reisman, Who Owns Taiwan: A Search
for International Title, 81 YALE L.J. 599 (1972); Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary
Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 879
(1999); Guiguo Wang & Priscilla M.F. Leung, One Country, Two Systems: Theory Into
Practice, 7 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 279 (1998).

125.
the war).
126.

See Gazzini, supra note 114, at 141-49 (recounting the different phases of
Id.
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and effectively engage in the activities of the subjects of international
law. In fact, the only reasonable explanation of the kind of
relationship they have with each other is that the PRC and the ROC
are two different subjects. At least since 1979, the Taipei government
stated that the ROC "is an independent sovereign state with a
legitimate established government."'1 27 On July 10, 1999, the
Taiwan and the
Taiwanese President noted that contacts between
128
PRC would be treated as "state-to-state relations.'
Starting from the assumption discussed above that recognition
has no constitutive effect, the fact that the vast majority of the
countries of the world do not recognize Taiwan does not, in itself,
constitute a ground to deny the existence of the ROC as an
independent state. 129 Recognition by most states that the PRC is,
today, "China" in international relations cannot be deemed
decisive. 130 The same can be said about the relationship between the
United Nations and China. Since 1971, when the PRC replaced the
ROC as the legitimate Chinese government holding the permanent
seat in the Security Council, 13 1 the idea that the ROC is not a state
132
any longer-and, in any event, is not China-has gained support.
But the United Nations-as a sovereign intergovernmental
organization-is allowed to decide which governments to admit as

127.
Id. at 150.
128.
See 1 SEAN D. MURPHY, UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
1999-2001 134 (2002). It has been argued that the main reason why Taiwan is not a
state under international law is that it does not claim to be one. See JAMES CRAWFORD,
THE CREATION OF STATES 151 (1979).
Therefore, the ROC should arguably be
considered a state after these proclamations. See also Alan M. Wachman, The State-toState Flap: Tentative Conclusions about Risk and Restraint in Diplomacy Across the
Taiwan Straits, 4 HARv. ASIA Q. (2000), available at http://www.fas.harvard.edu
-asiactr/haq/200001/000laOO8.htm.
129.
The reasoning underlying most analyses, though, is based precisely on this
assumption. See, e.g., Michael D. Swaine, Trouble in Taiwan, FOREIGN AFF. 39, 46-47
(Mar.-Apr. 2004). Swaine claims that "recognition of a people's status as a nation-state
is conferred by the international community and is highly subject to the calculations
and interests of the most influential powers involved" and concludes that "[bly this
standard, Taiwan is not currently an independent nation." Id. at 47. The real issue is,
of course, whether this is the appropriate standard.
130.
See Markus G. Puder, The Grass Will Not Be Trampled Because the Tigers
Need Not Fight New Thoughts and Old Paradigms for Detente Across the Taiwan
Strait, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 481, 520-22 (2001) (providing the number of states
holding various different positions in respect to the PRC and the ROC).
131.
As is well-known, G.A. Res. 2758 (XXVI) of October 25, 1971 did not treat
the admission of the delegates of the PRC as a membership issue, but rather as a
question of the right to represent the founding member, China. See SIMMA, supra note
12, at 157; see also Samuel S. Kim, The People's Republic of China in the United
Nations: A Preliminary Analysis, 26 WORLD POL. 299 (1974) (addressing the events
surrounding this fundamental switch in U.N. members' policy).
132.
See, e.g., Anthony D'Amato, Purposeful Ambiguity as International Legal
Strategy: The Two China Problem, in THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE
THRESHOLD OF THE 21ST CENTURY 109-11 (Jerzy Makarczyk ed., 1996).
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members and which governments to refuse. If the admission by the
U.N. of Byelorussia and the Ukraine did not elevate those republics
to the level of subjects of international law, 13 3 the refusal after 1971
to accept the ROC as a U.N. member does not necessarily have any
effect on the personality of the entity involved.
The alternative approach, which reconciles the factual reality of
the situation with the relevant legal principles, is to acknowledge
that notwithstanding the lack of recognition by a significant number
of the international community's members, it cannot be maintained
that the PRC was not a state before its accession to the United
Nations. Had the PRC attacked another country in the 1950s, this
would have been regarded as a war of international character. U.N.
Security Council Resolutions 82 to 85 dealing with the Korean War do
not mention Chinese intervention in the conflict. 134 But the Security
Council, with Resolution 88, did invite a representative of the PRC to
discuss the terms for a cease-fire in 1950.135 During the same period,
moreover, the Security Council, as reflected in Resolution 87,
considered that the dispute between the two Chinese entities-namely
the armed invasion of the island of Taiwan-was likely to lead to
international friction or to give rise to an international dispute. 136 In
this case, the Security Council was concerned about a possible war
between two states exercising their effective authority over different,
well-defined territories. PRC and Taiwan were thus regarded as
distinct-and formally equal-subjects of international law. Since
neither has ceased to exist to this date, they both continue to be
distinct subjects of international law.
U.S. courts have also recognized the fact that, regardless of
political considerations, the ROC is a subject, the same subject with
which the United States had entered into bilateral relations before
the recognition of the PRC. For example, in New York Chinese TV,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a finding
that Taiwan was still a party to a copyright treaty with the United
States signed in 1946.137 If the treaty is still in force, and no issue of
state succession is raised, then Taiwan still exists as the same subject

133.
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
134.
Sec. Res. 82, U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., 473d mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. S/1501
(1950); Sec. Res. 83, U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., 473d mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. S/1511 (1950);
Sec. Res. 84, U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., 473d mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. S/1588 (1950); Sec. Res.
85, U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., 473d mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. S/1657 (1950).
135.
Sec. Res. 88, U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., 520th mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc. S11892
(1950).
136.
Sec. Res. 87, U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., 506th mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc. S/1836
(1950).
137.
New York Chinese TV Programs Inc. v. U.E. Enter., 954 F.2d 847, 854 (2d
Cir. 1992).
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decisions, by U.S. and
of international law. Other similar judicial 138
conclusion.
same
the
to
point
non-U.S. courts,
The last cases confirm the view that some entities that are not
regarded as states under traditional international doctrine for
various reasons actually do enjoy the status of a subject within the
international realm and do possess all attributes normally sufficient
to qualify as states. They are considered subjects distinct from the
officially recognized government against which they are fighting; they
can be predecessors in matters of state succession; they are entitled to
enter into treaty relations with states on an equal footing. If they
succeed in replacing the old government, they are considered
representatives of the territory previously ruled by that one; if they
do not succeed, but perish, they are considered to be just like any
other conquered state. As long as these "competing" subjects coexist,
political considerations may lead certain subjects to treat them
differently from other states, but this does not signify that they are
essentially of a different nature.
In truth, considering personalities of entities involved in armed
conflicts-whether international or non-international-is a delicate
matter because a stable factual situation usually results only at the
end of the hostilities. The examples of Czechoslovakia (which was
regarded as a state after the end of the Great War, but as the same
subject as the belligerent during the hostilities), the CSA (which was
deemed a predecessor of the United States under international law,
just like any other "conquered state"), and China and Taiwan (which
have been distinct subjects of international law from the Chinese
Civil War to this day), however, all show that issues of identity and
the applicability of international law are not necessarily peculiar in
times of armed conflict.
7. Napoleon
Napoleon was exiled to the island of Elba in 1814. An
interpretation of the events surrounding his exile might be that
Napoleon, as Emperor, was simply replaced as the head of the French
state by King Louis XVIII; a simple substitution of governments took
place, and France remained substantially the same subject.
But the evidence points to a different conclusion. After
Napoleon's defeat, two different governments existed in France: one
under Napoleon, which controlled no territory, and one under Louis
XVIII. This is shown by the fact that, at the end of the war, two
treaties were signed. One of the treaties was signed, on the one side,

See, e.g., Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank, 104 F. Supp. 59 (N.D. Cal.
138.
1952); see also Gazzini, supra note 114, at 149-50 (citing the Kyoto District Court
Decision of 1977, reprinted in 22 JAPANESE ANN. INT'L L. 151 (1978)).
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between Austria, Russia, Prussia, and Great Britain and, on the
other, Napoleon, who renounced every right to France and accepted
the isle of Elba as his new territory. 139 The other treaty was signed by
the same Great Powers, on the one side, and by France, represented
by Louis XVIII, on the other. The international acts were, thus, two:
one stipulated by Napoleon, on behalf of his Court, his family, and his
army, 140 and the other by Louis XVIII. 14 1 The latter would be able to
regain for himself and his dynasty the territory of France only after,
and partly as a consequence of, the signing of this treaty. After
Napoleon's attempt to regain control of France and his confinement to
Saint Helen in 1815, Lord Chancellor Eldon, upon the request of the
British Prime Minister, wrote an opinion, which is of some interest,
14 2
on Napoleon's legal status.
If, before the Emperor of Elba [that is, Napoleon] entered France, to
regain the throne he was not a French Subject, does his Attempt to
regain that Throne again make him a French subject, or a French
subject in rebellion - If, upon Grounds resulting out of the various
situations & characters, in which [he] has been placed, & with which he
has been clothed, you can consider him as, in no way, in the relation of
Subject, or subject in rebellion ag[ainst] France, then may not the War
be considered as a War against him, ag[ainst] him as our Enemy,
without reference to any Character, that he may be alledged [sic] to
have, bound up in the national Character of France - against him & his
adherents making, as an Enemy against us, an hostile Attempt to
break down the System of Gov[ernment], which existed in France,
thereby introducing a System of Government in direct subversion of a
Treaty with our Allies, founded upon their & our insecurity[,] under
any such Government as he would introduce into France? If we can
make this out, then might we not steer clear of the difficulty, that
belongs to excluding from Peace with France or French Subject or a
French Rebel? [H]e would then be a distinct, substantive Enemy,
independent of any relation to the Sovereign of France, with whom we
might be at Peace, or in Alliance? [A] conquered Enemy indeed, with
whom, according to the Law of Nations, we should deal as mercifully as
our Security would admit after he was conquered. But then we should
only have to determine, as between ourselves & him, whether we did so
treat, and the rules of the Law of Nations would be to be applied in the

139.
Elba was not part of France, but rather, terra nullius since the extinction of
the Ludovisi dynasty. This demonstrates how Napoleon was not restricted to a smaller
territory than the one he was governing before; rather, he "migrated" with his court
and his (drastically diminished) army. See MIELE, supranote 32, at 18.
Trait6 entre l'Autriche, la Russie et la Prussie, d'une part, et Napoleon
140.
Bonaparte de l'autre; avec accession partielle de la Grande-Bretagne, Apr. 27, 1814, 1
Martens Recueil des Traitbs 696 (Supp.).
141.
Trait6 de paix sign6 entre la France et l'Autriche et ses allibs, May 30,
1814, 2 Martens Recueil des Traitds 1 (Supp.).
142.
John Hall Stewart, The Imprisonment of Napoleon: A Legal Opinion by
Lord Eldon, 45 AM. J. INT'L L. 571 (1951). This opinion was also published and
thoroughly explained in GAETANO ARANGIO-RUIZ, SULLA DINAMICA DELLA BASE SOCIALE
NEL DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 103-07 (1954) [hereinafter ARANGIO-RUIZ, DINAMICA],
where other similar examples are also cited.
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decision of that Question of fact, without reference to any Rule of that
Law to him as a Subject of any Sovereign?

Great Britain thus considered Napoleon to'be the rival "power," a
government. Conversely, it considered France not as an enemy, but
as an ally.
On March 25, 1815, Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia
had even signed a treaty, 143 to which France acceded, 144 according to
which, "having taken into consideration the consequences which the
Invasion of France by Napoleon Bonaparte, and the actual situation
of that Kingdom [created]," the parties agreed:
to direct in common, and with one accord, should the case require it, all
their efforts against [Napoleon], and against all those who should
already have joined his faction, or shall hereafter join it, in order to
force him to desist from his Projects, and render him unable to disturb
in future the tranquility of Europe and the General Peace.145

The subject of international law against whom the war had been
fought-and won-was Napoleon. He was the government who, once
Diplomatic
Britain. 146
by
been
conquered
had
defeated,
on
St.
Petersburg
diplomat
in
Maistre,
of
Joseph
de
correspondence
that
confirms
13,
1815
dated
July
of
Sardinia,
behalf of the Kingdom
"Ainsi les allis d~clarent solennement qu'ils ne font la guerre qu'&sa
sa personne est tombe
personne [that is, Napoleon]; et lorsqu'enfin
147
plus!
parlent
n'en
ils
mains,
leurs
sous
Had he been considered a war prisoner, albeit a former head of
state, the obligation on Great Britain would have been to send him
back to his country. The only explanation is that he was not a subject
of France, but that he had somehow elevated himself to a subject of
148
international law.

143.
Treaty of Alliance, Mar. 25, 1815, Aus.-Gr. Brit.-Pruss.- Russ., 64 Consol. T.
S. 28.
Id. at 66 (Declarations of the Plenipotentiaries of the Four Powers, Relative
144.
to the Accession of the King of France to the Preceding Treaty, May 1815).
Id. at 31-32.
145.
Napoleon had a territory and a population, though small, when he was
146.
given the kingdom of Elba. In contrast, he had none on Saint Helen, but this did not
prevent Great Britain from considering herself to be in a permanent state of war
against him. See ARANGIO-RUIZ, DINAMICA, supra note 142, at 106-07.
2 JOSEPH MARIE MAISTRE, CORRESPONDANCE DIPLOMATIQUE DE JOSEPH DE
147.
MAISTRE, 1811-1817 87 (Albert Blanc ed., 1860) (emphasis in original).
148.
ARANGIO-RUIZ, DINAMICA, supra note 142, at 106-07.
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III. POWERS AS SUBJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

A. Subjects superiorem non recognoscentes
All the cases analyzed above make up what Max Weber would
have called "inconvenient facts," those which a party to a struggle
does not wish to see. 149 Common experience dictates that a state
remains the same-retaining the same name, the same position in the
international community, the same rights and duties, the same
governmental structure-even if it acquires large swaths of new
territory 50 or, conversely, loses extensive areas previously under its
jurisdiction. Territory and population undoubtedly help in
establishing or consolidating a subject of international law and in
assisting the subject in claims of being a sovereign center of
authority. 151
The main issue, however, is the effective control over territory
and population-and the support that this effective control gives to
the idea of being the superior entity. 152 When a subject does not have

Max Weber, Science as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN
149.
SOCIOLOGY 147 (Hans Gerth & Wright Mills eds., 1975).
150.
See ENRICO ZAMUNER, LA FORMAZIONE DELLO STATO ITALIANO 47-51 (2002).
Zamuner carefully reviews the positions of scholars with respect to the conquest of the
Italian peninsula by the Kingdom of Sardinia during the early 1860s by comparing
preconceived ideas with documents from that time. One of the conclusions is that the
identity of the Kingdom of Sardinia, as a subject of international law, was not altered
by the conquest of the other states and by the modification of its name into "Kingdom
of Italy."
For an example of the many pronouncements in this sense, see the Aaland
151.
Islands case of 1920, where the report of the International Committee of Jurists
appointed to study the status of the islands stated that Finland did not become a
sovereign state "until a stable political organization had been created, and until the
public authorities had become strong enough to assert themselves throughout the
territories of the state" by themselves. LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. Spec. Supp. 4, at 8-9
(1920).
152.
The often cited Opinion No. 1 by the Badinter Commission regarding the
dissolution of Yugoslavia is somewhat misleading. The Commission, in order to reach
its conclusion that the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was in the process of
dissolution, noted three items: (1) the willingness of some republics to attain
independence (as such, not an element showing the creation of a new subject); (2) the
fact that the "composition and workings of the essential organs of the Federation no
longer meet the criteria or participation and representativeness inherent in a federal
State" (hardly a sign that a subject of international law is ceasing to exist); (3) the fact
that the "recourse to force has led to armed conflict between the different elements of
the Federation" and that "the authorities of the Federation and the Republics have
shown themselves to be powerless to enforce respect for the succeeding ceasefire
agreements." Only the last item (the loss of effective control by the federal organs)
might justify the conclusion that new independent entities were emerging, although
the fact that the republics seemed unable to enforce cease-fires might suggest that they
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authority over territory or population, as in the case of international
organizations or governments in exile, it is granted exceptions from
the (territorial) jurisdiction of the state(s) where it is based.
The fact that government is therefore the essential element
characterizing states as subjects of international law also explains
the common conception that, when no government is effectively
functioning, no state actually exists. 153 This is the case for all types of
annexations: the government of the annexing country is simply
considered to be extending jurisdiction over the territory and
population of the annexed country or territory. 154 It is also the case
for states ceasing to exist for debellatio, a conquest so total that it
includes devolution of sovereignty. 155 In all such situations, and in
were not in control of their internal structures and were not, therefore, subjects of
international law. Conference on Yugoslavia, Arbitration Committee, Opinion No. 1,
July 4, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 1494.
So-called "failed states" are actually governments unable to assert
153.
themselves as superiorem non recognoscentes. With regard to the confused situation of
Somalia and Somaliland, see GERARD KREIJEN, STATE FAILURE, SOVEREIGNTY AND
EFFECTIVENESS: LEGAL LESSONS FROM THE DECOLONIZATION OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
84-87 (2003); Steve Kibble, Somaliland: Surviving Without Recognition; Somalia:
Recognised but Failing?, 15 INT'L REL. 3 (2001); Riikka Koskenmaki, Legal
Implications Resulting from State Failurein Light of the Case of Somalia, 73 NORDIC J.
INT'L L. 1 (2004) (not distinguishing, however, the notions of "state" and of "subject of
international law"). See also Jan Nemitz, The Legal Status of the Republika Srpska,
43(2/3) OSTEUROPA-RECHT 89 (1997) (providing a theoretical analysis of whether the
"entity" of Republika Srpska within Bosnia and Herzegovina may be considered able to
assert itself as a state under international law).
One of the most representative examples of annexation is the German
154.
Anschluss of Austria in 1938. See, e.g., ROBERT E. CLUTE, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
STATUS OF AUSTRIA 1938-1955 (1962); James Wilford Garner, Question of State
Succession Raised by the German Annexation of Austria, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 421 (1938);
Schausberger, Der Anschluss, in OSTERREICH - DIE ZWEITE REPUBLIK (Erika Weinzier
ed., 1972); Herbert Wright, The Legality of the Annexation of Austria by Germany, 38
AM J. INT'L L. 621 (1944). The Preamble to the so-called 1955 "State Treaty" between
Austria and the four Occupying Powers (U.S.S.R., U.S., U.K., and France) explicitly
mentions the annexation of Austria and of its "participation in the war as an integral
part of Germany." See State Treaty, May 15, 1955, 6 U.S.T. 2369, 217 U.N.T.S. 223.
Article 1 implies that, after 1938, Austria did not exist anymore as a subject
superiorem non recognoscentes: "The Allied and Associated Powers recognise that
Austria is re-establishedas a sovereign, independent and democratic country." Id. The
same view is taken by HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 262 (1952).
155.
1 D.P. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 441 (2d ed. 1970). The typical case
is that of Germany after the Second World War. See Unconditional Surrender of
German Forces, May 8, 1945, reprinted in 1945 AM. J. INT'L L. SUPPL. 169 (1945); see
also Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany, in 7 DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY 217 (Leland M. Goodrich & Marie J. Carroll eds., 1947) ("There is no
central Government or authority in Germany capable of accepting the responsibility for
the maintenance of order, the administration of the country, and compliance with the
requirements of the victorious Powers."). In July 1951, President Truman expressed
his view that "[t]he rights of the Occupying Powers result from the conquest of
Germany, accompanied by the disintegration and disappearance of its former
government, and the Allied assumption of supreme authority." GERHARD VON GLAHN,
THE OCCUPATION OF ENEMY TERRITORY 289 (1957) (quoting the Information Bulletin
from the Office of the High Commissioner for Germany, August 1951). In this case, the
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many similar ones, the territory and the population continue to exist;
however, the state is said to have disappeared because of the lack of
an effective and independent government.
A short historical analysis may help to establish a "least common
denominator" rule for identifying subjects of international law.
Throughout the history of modern international relations, the main
feature of subjects of international law has been their ability to assert
that they are not subordinates to other authorities; in other words,
subjects of international law were those entities superiorem non
recognoscentes, able not to recognize any superior within the
international community. This feature is at the basis of the fact that
the international community is not structured as a hierarchical
156
society, but rather as a community of (formal) peers.
defeat had as a consequence the complete annihilation of the state apparatus-and
therefore the lack of any identity of the Reich with the subjects later arisen on the
same territory (the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic).
This is shown by the fact, for example, that France, the U.K., and the USA decided in
1950 to authorize the West German government to "give effect to" German Reich
treaties. See Elmer Plischke, Reactivation of Prewar German Treaties, 48 AM. J. INT'L
L. 245, 252 (1954); see also Frederik A. Mann, The Present Legal Status of Germany, in
JAHRBUCH FOR INTERNATIONALES UND AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT 27 (1948)

(concluding that "Germany has ceased to be an independent sovereign state in the
sense of international law, but continues to be a state"); Kay Hailbronner, Legal
Aspects of the Unification of the Two German States, 2 EUR. J. INT'L L. 18, 22 (1991);
Hans Kelsen, The Legal Status of Germany According to the Declarationof Berlin, 1945
AM. J. INT'L L. 518 (1945). No relevance can be given, in the international arena, to
domestic decisions based on the legal fiction that the Federal Republic of Germany was
identical (or "partly identical") to the German Reich as an "international legal subject."
See, e.g., Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts
[BVERFGE] [Federal
Constitutional Court] 36, 1 (16, 22) (F.R.G.), available at http://www.oefre.unibe.chllaw/
dfr/bv036001.html (last visited Nov. 2004).
The decision states that "[die
Bundesrepublik Deutschland ist also nicht 'Rechtsnachfolger' des Deutschen Reiches,
sondern als Staat identisch mit dem Staat 'Deutsches Reich', - in bezug auf seine
raumliche Ausdehnung allerdings 'teilidentisch."' Id. But, later on, it states that "[d]ie
Deutsche Demokratische Republik ist im Sinne des Volkerrechts ein Staat und als
solcher Vblkerrechtssubjekt." Id. Therefore, regardless of the statement that there
was a German unitary state. comprising the territories and populations of Federal
Republic of Germany and of the German Democratic Republic, the decision must
recognize that the German Democratic Republic "is a state in the sense of international
law and, as such, a subject of international law." Id. This entails that the two German
states were both independent subjects of international law.
156.
The United Nations does not constitute anything short of a world-wide
society. See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949
I.C.J. 174 (Apr. 11). On the general issue of the personality of the United Nations and
its consequences, see Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, The 'FederalAnalogy' and U.N. Charter
Interpretation:A Crucial Issue, 8 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1 (1997). Various legal and political
scholars have suggested that, since the end of the Cold War, a major "shift" in
international relations has occurred which would have led to an increasingly
"verticalized" organization of the international community. See, e.g., MICHAEL HARDT
& ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE CH. 2 (2000); Ugo Mattei, Globalization and Empire: A
Theory of Imperial Law: A Study on U.S. Hegemony and the Latin Resistance, 10 IND.
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 383, 399-402 (2003). In my opinion, these suggestions lack
decisive proof in order to be adopted as useful legal theories.
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States, as we know them, were born as entities superiorem non
recognoscentes when weakening political and religious bodies
gradually lost their purported universal jurisdiction during the
Middle Ages. 15 7 The expression ius inter gentes did not appear until
after the Westphalian Peace, when it was used by the English scholar
Richard Zouche. 158 Only at this time was there a commonly shared
doctrinal acknowledgement of the fact that the respublica christiana
had broken up into different effective authorities; international law
as we understand it could then be conceived. 159 Thus, the only
constitutional rules of the law of nations are the factual equality of
members and their exemption from superior authority. In the
international community, the functions of law-making, lawdetermining, and law-enforcement are not organized in any
160
centralized way.
This is reflected by the statement that states are independent.
Independence, in this sense, is the feature distinguishing subjects of
international law from other entities. The only possible analogy in
this respect, although partial, is not the comparison between states
under international law and juridical entities in domestic systems,
but rather between states and natural persons. 161 The fact that
domestic systems view the state as a juridical person is not sufficient

157.
51 (1947).
158.

ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 23-28, 36GIULIANO ET AL., supra note 15, at 38.

159.
But legal scholars in the previous centuries had already pointed out that, in
fact, local authorities were in charge of all the affairs and that the Emperor ruled de
jure, with no effective power. The formula "superioremnon recognoscens"is a product
See ALBERTO MIELE, 1 LA COMUNITA
of this high.level theoretical analysis.
N. SIDNEY WOOLF,
INTERNAZIONALE (I CARATTERI ORIGINARI) 45 (2000); CECIL
BARTOLUS OF SASSOFERRATO, HIS POSITION IN THE HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL POLITICAL

THOUGHT 371-83 (1913).
GAETANO ARANGIO-RUIZ, THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON FRIENDLY
160.
RELATIONS AND THE SYSTEM OF THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 235 (1979)

The existence of this
[hereinafter ARANGIO-RUIZ, THE U.N. DECLARATION].
constitutional (fundamental) rule does not deny states the possibility to agree on and
submit themselves to certain rules in some fields of conduct. Such agreements,
however, do not have more authority to change the fundamental structure of the
international community than normal contracts have to change the fundamental legal
order within a country.
According to all systems of modern legal practice, a juridical entity (such as
161.
an organization, a company, a trade union, a political party, or even a federated state)
within a domestic system derives its existence, and its rights and duties, from its
recognition by the law and, therefore, by the system itself. In this process of
constitutive recognition, the state is (must be) superior to the entity in order to be able
to recognize it and its acts. Most philosophical and political theories have, on the
contrary, abandoned the view that a human being can be denied its status according to
the will of the state; human beings are persons as such: states just take them as given,
and then attach rights and duties to them. For a complete discussion of this theory
applied to international law, see GAETANO ARANGIO-RUIZ, GLI ENTI SOGGETTI
DELL'ORDINAMENTO INTERNAZIONALE 98-108, 373-409 (1951).
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to transfer this approach to the arena of international relations. "The
Law of the Nations is but private law 'writ large.' It is an application
to political communities of those legal ideas that were originally
applied to the relations of individuals. Its leading distinctions are
therefore naturally those with which private law has long ago
rendered us familiar." 162 International law takes states for granted
and does not prescribe a model they need to follow in order to be
recognized as states. 163 This does not necessarily mean, especially in
the past sixty years, that international law has not come to prescribe
anything on how a country should be governed. These prescriptions,
however, do not impeach the fact that a state is a subject within the
international community; these prescriptions, in effect, presuppose
164
this membership.
Vattel described this situation in the following terms:
[U]n Etat est ... un corps politique ....
Toute nation qui se gouverne
elle-m~me, sous quelque forme que ce soit, sans d6pendence d'aucun
6tranger, est un Etat souverain ....
Pour qu'une nation ait droit de
figurer imm~diatement dans cette grande societ6, il suffit qu'elle soit
v~ritablement souveraine & ind6pendante, c'est-A-dire qu'elle se
165
gouverne elle-m~me, par sa propre autorit6 & par ses lois.

By the end of the eighteenth century, the idea that recognition would
somehow create (or help establish) other states was therefore
implicitly rejected because the intrinsic equality among sovereign
states rendered such a process impossible.
The analysis by Vattel on the status of international law during
his time, moreover, is relevant both to the issue of subjects of
international law other than states and especially to the subjects
arising from an insurrection or a civil war. Vattel clarifies that rebels
are "sujets qui prennent injustement les armes contre le conducteur
167
de la socit&''16 6 and that the Sovereign has a right to repress them.
Nonetheless, if an insurgency is strong enough (because it stops
obeying the sovereign and resists him) and it forces the sovereign to
make war to try to defeat it, 168 then a civil war starts, and the civil
war "fait naitre deux parties ind~pendans," that is, gives birth to two
independent parties, both subjects of international law. The fact that
they are two subjects of international law derives from the

162.
163.

THOMAS E. HOLLAND, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 152 (1898).
MIELE, supra note 32, at 5.

164.

Arangio-Ruiz, Dualism Revisited, supra note 19, at 949-51.

165.
1 EMMERICH DE VATTEL, LES DROIT DES GENS OU PRINCIPES DE LA LOI
NATURELLE APPLIQUES A LA CONDUITE & AUX AFFAIRES DES NATIONS & DES SOUVERAINS

11-12 (1775).
166.
3 id. at 129.
167.
Id. at 130.
168.
Id. at 132.
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acknowledgement that they regard themselves as enemies and do not
recognize any common authority to judge them. That is, they are both
superiorem non recognoscentes, and the same obligations existing
between states apply to the parties of a civil war. 169 It is noteworthy
that Vattel wrote this at about the time of the successful rebellion of
the thirteen U.S. colonies against British rule; his book aptly
describes the course of the war of independence on that occasion and
provides a fundamental tool for understanding similar events.
A few years later, William Blackstone described the subjects of
international law in essentially the same way:
[A]s it is impossible for the whole race of mankind to be united in one
great society, they must necessarily divide into many; and form
separate states, commonwealths, and nations, entirely independent of
each other, and yet liable to a mutual intercourse. Hence arises a third
kind of law to regulate this mutual intercourse called 'law of nations':
which, as none of these states will acknowledge a superiority in the
170
other, cannot be dictated by any.

Another principle follows from the idea that states do not
recognize a higher authority-namely, that each state is to treat
other states as equal legal subjects. This concept, too, is challenged
from time to time on the basis of political considerations, but strictly
speaking, on legal grounds, general international law cannot accept
171
such pretensions without losing its very meaning.
Vattel refers to states and other groups (what today we would
call "belligerents"). Blackstone apparently refers only to states and
not to insurgents or belligerents. Nonetheless, when he refers to the
lack of superior recognized authority, he is taking into account all
self-proclaimed effective governments not recognizing any superior.
Therefore, subjects of international law are such only when they are
actually superiorem non recognoscentes, i.e., when they are able to

Id. at 132-33. The expression "superiorem non recognoscens (-ntes in the
169.
plural)" explains the claims of medieval local rulers to act independently in respect of
the Emperor and of the Pope. See, e.g., Kenneth Pennington, Learned Law, Droit
Savant, Gelehrtes Recht: The Tyranny of a Concept, 20 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM.
205, 214 (1994). Today, the expression is used to describe entities acting independently
on the international arena. See, e.g., ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A
DIVIDED WORLD 397 (1986) (discussing the progressive replacement of this principle
with a concept of international law based on a more energetic sense of community).
170.

4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 42

(14th ed. 1803) (emphasis added). Although reference apparently is made by the
English scholar to "mankind" as constituting the population of the world and the
states, the stress is then exclusively put on the fact that these states (or, rather, their
governments) do not recognize any superior authority. No relevance is placed on
population or territory as qualifying, or essential, elements of these subjects.
171.

See UNITED STATES HEGEMONY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL

LAW 117-95 (Michael Byers & Georg Nolte eds., 2003) (appraising the contemporary
interplay between this fundamental principle of international law and the hegemonic
pretensions of the United States).
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act, in principle, with no superior entity restricting them, unless they
have accepted those restrictions. Such a statement logically implies a
minimum of internal organization allowing each entity to act as a
whole, as one subject vis-A-vis others. There is at least a prima facie
case that no element other than this understanding of sovereignty
(for example, territory, population, intercourse with other entities,
recognition) defines a subject of international law.
B. Intergovernmental Organizationsand Other Subjects
States are, therefore, one class of the many entities superiorem
non recognoscentes. Although territory and population distinguish
them on the descriptive level from other subjects, no essential
differentiation is warranted with respect to the legal status of entities
that may lack, at some point in their existence or even at all times, a
stable territory or population (or both).
This is further illustrated by the fact that rules of general
international law also apply, with the necessary adjustments, to
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). In their case, too,
international legal personality does not flow from recognition by other
subjects of international law or from the simple recognition of that
international personality by the member states in the establishing
treaty. It is only when the formal establishment of the IGO is
followed by its effective possibility to act independently as a distinct
subject that international legal personality actually ensues.' 72 From
that moment onward, the organization also acquires a personality
distinct from those of its member states, at least as long as it is able
to maintain such de facto independence. 17 3 It is therefore not clear
why the view is widely held that intergovernmental organizations are
not among the "primary players" in international law.
In fact, the International Court of Justice has stated that IGOs
are bound not only by their constitutive instruments and by the
treaties they conclude, but also by "any obligations incumbent upon
them under general rules of international law."'174 IGOs are therefore
generally subject to all rules pertaining to other subjects, except those
not applicable to them for factual reasons in the specific
circumstances of each case. For example, when an IGO-which
usually does not control any territory-exercises the functions of a
government over a territory and a population, e.g. East Timor
(through UNTAET) 175 and Kosovo (through UNMIK), 176 it is deemed

172.

ARANGIO-RUIZ, THE U.N. DECLARATION, supra note 160, at 243-46.

173.
Id. at 246-48.
174.
Agreement between the WHO and Egypt, 1980 I.C.J. 67, 37.
175.
On October 25, 1999, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1272,
establishing a United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)
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to be subject to all customary rules pertaining to the treatment of
nationals by states, even though such regimes are not deemed to
possess full-fledged sovereignty over those territories. 177 UNMIK, for
instance, was deemed to be subject to human rights standards
applicable to European states. l78 To be able to enjoy immunity from
responsibility arising out of the misconduct of its agents in those
territories-much like the state it was replacing had tried to do in the
past-UNMIK was forced to have recourse to carefully drafted
immunity instruments, and this shows that immunity would not
of
immunity
traditional
the
from
follow
automatically
organizations. 179 UNMIK even signed a technical act with the
Council of Europe relating to the European Convention for the
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, which allows an independent committee of experts to
examine the treatment of persons in Kosovo deprived of their liberty
80
by UNMIK.
Another borderline example is the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC), an international non-governmental
organization (created by individuals, not states) recognized as an
independent holder of rights and duties, acting as a peer to states in
"endowed with overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor and . . .
empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority, including administration
1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272
of justice." Sec. Res. 1272, U.N. SCOR, 4057th mtg. at 2,
(1999).
On June 10, 1999, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1244,
176.
establishing a U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), including a
wide range of specifically indicated responsibilities. Sec. Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR,
11, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999). The first legislative act by
4011th mtg. at 2,
UNMIK clarified that "[a]ll legislative and executive authority with respect to Kosovo,
including the administration of the judiciary, is vested in UNMIK." UNMIK Reg.
1999/1, at 1, U.N. Doc. UNMIK/REG/1999/1 (1999).
See Andreas Zimmermann & Carten Stahn, Yugoslav Territory, United
177.
Nations Trusteeship or Sovereign State? Reflections on the Current and Future Legal
Status of Kosovo, 71 NORDIC J. OF INT'L L. 423, 425-29 (2001); see also Michael Bothe &
Thilo Marauhn, U.N. Administration of Kosovo and East Timor: Concept, Legality and
Limitations of Security Council-Mandated TrusteeshipAdministration, in KOSOVO AND
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, A LEGAL ASSESSMENT 217 (Christian Tomuschat ed.,

2002); Michael Matheson, United Nations Governance of Postconflict Societies, 95 AM.
J. INT'L L. 76 (2001).
The Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo has repeatedly denounced alleged
178.
misconduct by UNMIK--considered a "surrogate state" (or, rather, a "surrogate
See Jonas Nilsson, UNMIK and the
government")-against Kosovo residents.
Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo: Human Rights Protection in a United Nations
"SurrogateState," 22 NETHERLANDS Q. HUM. RTS. 123 (2004).
In a similar way, although "blue-helmet" U.N. peace-keepers are not
179.
generally regarded as combatants, it is suggested that the rules of armed conflict apply
to forces authorized by the U.N. when they are "engaged in hostilities as a belligerent."
See Christopher Greenwood, Protection of Peacekeepers: The Legal Regime, 7 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 185, 188 (1996).
Press Release, UNMIK, SRSG Soren Jessen-Petersen and Walter
180.
Schwimmer, Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, Sign Two Agreements (Aug.
23, 2004), available at http://www.unmikonline.org (last visited Nov. 2004).
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international relations and having as its main objective the protection
of certain individuals during armed conflict.1 81 According to Article 9
of the First, Second, and Third 1949 Conventions and Article 10 of
the Fourth Convention, the ICRC is entrusted with the mandate of
providing relief to victims of armed conflict. Article 81 of Additional
Protocol I strengthens this right of initiative by imposing upon states
obligations to cooperate with the ICRC. The ICRC has signed treaties,
such as the "Agreement between the International Committee of the
Red Cross and the Swiss Federal Council to determine the legal
status of the Committee in Switzerland" of March 19, 1993,182 which
provides for almost all of the immunities usually enjoyed by
intergovernmental
organizations.
These
cases,
which
are
representative of many similar ones, show that nothing prevents
subjects that appear different from states from having rights and
obligations traditionally attributed to states only.
C. Is There a Real Difference in the Treatment of State and Non-State
Actors?
One of the main problems of the traditional view espoused in the
Restatement is that most scholars derive from this definition the
consequence that if an entity does not meet the criteria to be
considered a state, it is, at best, a "minor" subject of international
law; in extreme cases, it might not be regarded a subject of
international law at all. In the face of this problem, uncertainties are
posed by those entities that do not fulfill the traditional criteria of
"states" but nevertheless act in the international arena with all the
183
rights and duties they can effectively possess.
One possible approach may be to identify what the "least
common denominator" of these subjects really is-namely, effective
sovereignty. The proposal is to use the word "powers" to define all

181.
See, e.g., GEORGES WILLEMIN & ROGER HEACOCK, THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF
WORLD SOCIETY 199-202 (1984); Allan Rosas, Notes on the Legal Status of National Red
Cross Societies, in CHRISTOPHE SWINARSKI & JEAN PICTET, STUDIES AND ESSAYS ON
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND RED CROSS PRINCIPLES IN HONOUR OF JEAN

PICTET 959, 960-64 (1984).
182.
The text of the treaty is available at http://www.icrc.org (last visited Nov.
2004).
183.
Scholars have dealt with this problem in different ways. See, e.g., Eric Suy,

New Players in International Relations, in STATE,

SOVEREIGNTY, AND INTERNATIONAL
GOVERNANCE 373-83 (Gerard Kreijen ed., 2002). The need to move beyond the idea of

an international legal system essentially made up of sovereign states is also
highlighted by Penelope Simmons, The Emergence of the Idea of the Individualized
State in the InternationalLegal System, 5 J. HIST. INT'L L. 293, 334-35 (2003).
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are effectively able not to recognize any entity as
those subjects that
84
their superior.'
In this sense, all powers are equal under international law
because governments as such do not differ from one another,
although their territorial basis may vary greatly. The formal equality
of subjects-like the formal equality of human beings before domestic
systems-does not prevent huge differences in wealth, size, or age.
Thus, for example, a non-state power without a territory is not
subject to the rules of international law governing territory for the
simple reason that it does not have a territory. Similarly, a state
without coastlines is not subject to the rules governing, for example,
territorial waters; this does not imply that that state is essentially
different from other states with coastlines, but only that a difference
of fact confines its rights and duties. Should that state acquire,
legally or not, a coast, its essence would not be modified; rather, it
would have new rights and duties flowing from that new factual
position. In both cases, there is no need to create a special category of
subjects construed as qualitatively "inferior" to states. The addition of
new subjects to the international community (usually identified as
transnational corporations, human rights' NGOs, and financial
would be only an "environmental change," not a
IGOs), even if true,
"systemic change. ' 18 5
With respect to the "hegemonic" pretensions of certain states
8 6
during certain phases of the history of international relations,
formal equality may at times be challenged by the material ability of
one or more players to use legal rules, and even to develop new laws,
for their own purposes. But in this day and age this appears to be the
case almost exclusively within IGOs, and within the United Nations'
system in particular. These treaty-based organizations are not an
accurate reflection of what the international community is like, and
they do not have any direct effect on the "constitutional" framework
18 7
of the international community.

The term "power" is used as a synonym of "independent entity participating
184.
in international relations." Arangio-Ruiz, Dualism Revisted, supra note 19, at n.89.
Richard H. Steinberg, Who is Sovereign?, 40 STAN J. INT'L L. 329, 334
185.
(2004).

For a legal definition of "hegemonic international law," see Jose E. Alvarez,
186.
Hegemonic International Law Revisited, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 873 (2003); Detlev F. Vagts,
Hegemonic InternationalLaw, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 843 (2001).

This difference does not appear to be fully understood by some authors, who
187.
compare hegemonic pretensions by Great Powers in past centuries with the present
structure of the United Nations, where some countries have a special position not
because they are essentially different, but on the basis of the provisions of the U.N.
Charter. See, e.g., GERRY SIMPSON, GREAT POWERS AND OUTLAW STATES 91-131, 165-

93, 352-53 (2004). To argue that this distinction is not relevant because practically all
states are today members of the U.N. misses the point for various reasons. First, newly
created states do not necessarily join the organization immediately; their status before
they do so is clearly extremely important. Second, as the case of Yugoslavia has
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D. Effective Authority
Each authority superiorem non recognoscens is a subject formally
at the same level of the others and is also a subject forming part of
the so-called "international community." The question is, therefore,
what exactly is this authority superiorem non recognoscens? What
exactly is a power in the sense of international law? It is not the
individual persons making up the government, apart from rare
instances (e.g., Napoleon); nor it is a specific government as such.
Rather, it seems to be a government as the expression of a system
that reasonably considers itself identical to previous ones in relation
to other subjects of international law. In this sense, the Soviet
government after the October Revolution may be considered a new
government, a new power vis-A-vis the international community. Its
willingness and ability to mark its differences with the previous
governments (the Tsarist one and the ad interim one between
February and October), even against widespread protests, show that
the new Soviet power did make its case for discontinuity. 8 8 In
contrast, for example, the Islamic Revolution in Iran, which led to the
establishment of a radically new government, accepted its continuity
with the previous governments, as shown by the many awards
rendered by the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal citing the position of Iran
itself in the international arena.18 9 In this case, there is a succession
of governments, in the domestic sense, without any change in state
identity (in the meaning of international law). A factual analysis

shown, there might be specific periods when U.N. membership of a state is contentious.
In fact, it has been argued that the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" was barred from
U.N. membership in 1992, as the Security Council and the General Assembly rejected
its claim to continue the membership of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
The Resolutions required Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to apply for membership
as a new state. See S.C. Res. 777, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3116th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/Res/777 (1992); G.A. Res. 47/1, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Agenda Item 8, U.N. Doc.
A/Res/47/1 (1992). Third, not all subjects of international law are "states" according to
the definition provided by the Restatement and by the Montevideo Convention.
The fact that the U.S.S.R. was unanimously considered bound by previous
188.
(tsarist) debts and obligations does not necessarily contradict this reasoning. In fact, a
rule of compulsory continuity of obligations has developed during the XIX and XX
centuries with regard to instances of state succession and has been recently applied in
a consistent manner to the cases of the dissolution of U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia, and
Czechoslovakia. See Guido Acquaviva, The Dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Fate of
Its FinancialObligations,30 DENy. J. INT'L L. & POLY 173, 213-14 (2002).
189.
Thus, assertions made by the subject involved provide one of the tools to
establish whether, for example, a revolution had the effect of destroying the identity of
the subject of international law. See the case of Iran after the revolution of 1979, as
decided by the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal in the case United States v. Iran, where the
Tribunal based its reasoning that "[t]he revolutionary changes in Iran fall under the
heading of State continuity, not State succession" on the previous finding that "Iran
does not assert that its situation is one of State succession." 32 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep.
162, 176 (1996).
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must be carried out by legal scholars and practitioners on a case-bycase basis to assess all relevant facts in light of the law.
As is shown by the cases in which there is continuity between a
non-state actor and a state actor (e.g., the Czechoslovak National
Council and all cases in which a liberation movement seizes power
over a state), both state and non-state "powers" are superiorem non
recognoscentes. This definition of sovereignty constitutes, in theory,
only a display of effective authority.190 The pivotal requirement, for
state and non-state actors alike, to be regarded as subjects of
international law and to be able to assert identity is an effective
display of authority. 19 1 In this sense, there is no real dichotomy of
"form" and "fact." An entity needs to be in fact superiorem non
recognoscens to become a formal peer in international relations.
Should the entity lose its de facto ability to exclude other subjects, it
will also lose its formal status as a subject of international law.
To understand whether this effective authority is actually
exercised, two alternative tests can be used: authority within the
entity itself or relations with other subjects on a level of formal
equality. When the former test is met, an entity is a power, a subject
of international law. If the first test is not met-because of the lack of
data or inconclusive evidence-one might turn to the second one that,
however, only provides for a rebuttable presumption that an entity is
indeed a subject of international law. The first helps to understand
the true reality of things in cases such as Taiwan, when recognition is
withheld on political grounds. The second is particularly relevant in
understanding dubious cases of effective authority, such as those of
the Holy See or Napoleon. These tests should not be understood as
part of the definition of what a subject of international law is; rather,
they should be used as evidence to make this finding, which is
essentially factual in nature.

190.
The decisions of various domestic courts denying that artificial islands
declaring their "independence" can be regarded as states under international law
appear, therefore, to miss the mark in holding that these entities are not states
because of the lack of land or of a "cohesive community." See, e.g., the German case In
re Duchy of Sealand, 80 I.L.R. 683 (1978) and the Italian case Chierici v. Ministry of
the Merchant Navy, 71 I.L.R. 258 (1969). In all such cases, the entities considered
were not subjects of international law only because they were not able to establish
themselves as superiorem non recognoscentes.
191.
In cases of states, this is expressed by saying that government is "the most
important single criterion of statehood, since all others depend on it." JAMES
CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 42 (1979); see also

Chantal Charpentier, Les diclarationsdes Douzes sur la reconnaissance des nouveaux
Etats, in 96 REVUE GgNtRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 343, 351 (1992).
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FOCUS TO RESPONSIBILITY

One of the ways to gather evidence on effective authority by a
subject is to shift the attention from issues of personality to issues of
responsibility. It has been pointed out that when the law is
"confronted with nasty behaviour from entities that are not generally
to be considered states, [it] runs into problems.' 92 States try to
restrict IGOs by, for example, drafting conventions on their behalf
193
that unreasonably modify the rules applicable to all subjects.
States also try to introduce distinctions between inter-state conflicts
and other conflicts, 194 although authoritative interpretation of legal
instruments increasingly stresses that, in the most fundamental
areas, the difference in regime between states and other subjects of
international law is narrowing.' 95 In addition, this "statist" prejudice
creates the problem of unreasonably limiting the scope of important
instruments in preventing crimes jure gentium.196 But an attempt
can be made to apply the basic concepts of responsibility to the
international community. 197 An entity is not ultimately responsible

192.
Jan Kiabbers, (I Can't Get No) Recognition: Subjects Doctrine and the
Emergence of Non-State Actors, in NORDIC COSMOPOLITANISM 351, 354 (Jarna Petman
& Jan Klabbers eds., 2003).
Id. at 356 (providing examples of "childish" behavior in the drafting of the
193.
"Convention of the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or
between Organizations" and the treatment of United Nation's laissez-passer).
Compare Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949,
194.
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Dec. 12,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 8, 1978), with Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of NonInternational Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609. See also LIESBETH
ZEGVELD, ACCOUNTABILITY OF ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1426 (2002) (discussing the obligations of armed groups under inter-state treaties);
Christine Byron, Armed Conflicts: Internationalor Non-International?,6 J. CONFL. &
SECURITY L. 63 (2001); Theodore Meron, The Humanization of HumanitarianLaw, 94
Am.J. INT'L L. 239, 260-75 (2000) (discussing the different nature of the two Protocols
and their threshold of application).
195.
See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, $ 96-137 (ICTY App. Chamber 1995) (stating
that article 3 common to the four Geneva Convention of 1949 is applicable to all armed
conflicts, whether international or non-international in nature).
See, e.g., Grant M. Dawson, Defining Substantive Crimes Within the Subject
196.
Matter Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court: What is the Crime of
Aggression?, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 413, 444 (2000) (pointing out that one
of the most widely accepted definitions of aggression envisages that only individuals
affiliated with states can be responsible for that crime, thus excluding terrorists,
insurgents, revolutionary groups, and other non-state actors).
197.
See Draft Article on State Responsibility, Report of the International Law
Commission on the work of its 53rd session, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, Ch.
IV.E.1, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001). The fact that these articles are meant only to apply
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when it is dependent on another to act, when it is not genuinely in
control of its own decisions, or when it derives its existence and
powers from another entity's authority. For the purposes of
international law, it is not a subject. In other cases, however-such as
with states, de facto governments, belligerents, and IGOs-subjects
are, in fact, held responsible under international law. This is because
they have effectively established their authority as "superior." They
consequently deserve to be endowed with rights and duties under
international law.
Thus, by expanding the wording of articles 5 to 10 of the Draft
Articles on State Responsibility 9 8 and applying the same principles
to states does not prevent their use as evidence that these principles are binding upon
other subjects, too. Draft Article 33 provides:
1. The obligations of the responsible State set out in this Part may be owed to
another State, to several States, or to the international community as a whole,
depending in particular on the character and content of the international
obligation and on the circumstances of the breach. 2. This Part is without
prejudice to any right, arising from the international responsibility of a State,
which may accrue directly to any person or entity other than a State.
Id. art. 33.
198.
Article 5 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility provides:
Conduct of persons or entities exercising elements of governmental
authority. The conduct of a person or entity which is not an organ of the State
under article 4 but which is empowered by the law of that State to exercise
elements of the governmental authority shall be considered an act of the State
under international law, provided the person or entity is acting in that capacity
in the particular instance.
Id. art. 5. Article 6:
Conduct of organs placed at the disposal of a State by another State.
The conduct of an organ placed at the disposal of a State by another State shall
be considered an act of the former State under international law if the organ is
acting in the exercise of elements of the governmental authority of the State at
whose disposal it is placed.
Id. art. 6. Article 7:
Excess of authority or contravention of instructions. The conduct of an
organ of a State or of a person or entity empowered to exercise elements of the
governmental authority shall be considered an act of the State under
international law if the organ, person or entity acts in that capacity, even if it
exceeds its authority or contravenes instructions.
Id. art. 7. Article 8:
Conduct directed or controlled by a State. The conduct of a person or group of
persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law if the
person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the
direction or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct.
Id. art. 8. Article 9:
Conduct carried out in the absence or default of the official
authorities. The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered
an act of a State under international law if the person or group of persons is in
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to non-state actors, it follows that entities, organs, or persons that
opposed to sovereign
only derived authority-as
exercise
authority-are not themselves responsible under international law.
The Commentary to the Draft Articles on State Responsibility
clarifies that "no government can be held responsible for the conduct
of rebellious groups committed in violation of its authority" and that
this is "premised on the assumption that the structures and
organization of the movement are and remain independent of those of
the State."'199
For example, Turkey was deemed responsible by the European
Court of Human Rights for violations of human rights that occurred
in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, an entity under its
actual authority. 20 0 It was not possible for Turkey to "shift the blame"
to the purported authorities of Northern Cyprus because
international law looks at the reality of the situation, not at the
cloaks devised for political purposes. This is not different from what
happens when a state within a federation infringes upon the rights of
a foreign country: the federation answers for the international

fact exercising elements of the governmental authority in the absence or
default of the official authorities and in circumstances such as to call for the
exercise of those elements of authority.
Id. art. 9. Article 10:
Conduct of an insurrectional or other movement. 1. The conduct of an
insurrectional movement which becomes the new government of a State shall
be considered an act of that State under international law. 2. The conduct of a
movement, insurrectional or other, which succeeds in establishing a new State
in part of the territory of a pre-existing State or in a territory under its
administration shall be considered an act of the new State under international
law. 3. This article is without prejudice to the attribution to a State of any
conduct, however related to that of the movement concerned, which is to be
considered an act of that State by virtue of articles 4 to 9.
Id. art. 10.
199.
Commentary on the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, Report of the
International Law Commission on the work of its 53rd session, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess.,
Supp. No. 10, Ch. IV.E.2, at 112-13, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001); see also Responsibility of
International Organizations, Report of the International Law Commission on the work
of its 56th session, U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 102-09, U.N. Doc. A/59/10
(2004).
62-63
200. See Loizidou v. Turkey (Admissibility), 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A),
(1995). The court stated:
[T]he responsibility of a Contracting Party may also arise when as a
consequence of military action-whether lawful or unlawful-it exercises
effective control of an area outside its national territory. The obligation to

secure, in such an area, the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention
derives from the fact of such control whether it be exercised directly, through its
armedforces, or through a subordinatelocal administration....
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breach. 20 1 In contrast, acts by the Taiwanese authorities are not
imputed to the PRC government, for the simple reason that the latter
lacks effective control over the former. And it would be fundamentally
2
unjust to do so. 02
The necessary condition for an entity to be considered a "power,"
a subject of international law, seems to be the fact that the entity is
able to establish itself as superiorem non recognoscens, as an entity
that engages in relations as a peer with other subjects and that,
therefore, is held responsible when it causes damage. The best way
to understand if an entity is really superiorem non recognoscens and if
it is indeed a subject of international law (whether the international
community agrees to calling it "state" or not) is the fact that breaches
emanating from its "organs"-considered in the broadest terms-are
imputed to that entity, and not to others. 20 3 Thus, although from a
logical standpoint personality comes before responsibility, the latter
is a means to carry out the complex empirical analysis needed to
establish whether an entity is sovereign.
This explains why Napoleon was considered to be, at a certain
point and regardless of his relationship with the territory and
population of France, a subject of international law: he was able to
create "international" problems, raising the concerns of Great Britain,
Austria-Hungary, and Russia. Similar cases are those of the Franco
regime before the conquest of Madrid and of the Confederates during
the U.S. Civil War: in both cases entities rebelling against the central
authorities reached a degree of power and authority such that the
opponent, and the international community, could no longer deal with
them as an internal matter. Acts by these entities had international
consequences that could not be ascribed to any other existing
international subject, not even using the fictio of vicarious
responsibility. They had become subjects under international law.

201.

See Lynchings of Italians at New Orleans and Elsewhere, in MOORE, supra

note 91, at 837-49 (describing the controversies arising from the failure to prevent and
punish the lynching of some foreign nationals by various U.S. states which led to the
recognition of responsibility by the United States' government).
202.
One would just need to consider, for example, the absurdity of attributing
to the PRC a breach of the rule of international law prohibiting aggression in the
unlikely event of Taiwanese armed attack against Japan. In this hypothetical case, a
state of war would not exist between Japan and the PRC. On the contrary, should the
Texas State Guard invade Mexico under orders by the Governor of Texas, the actabsent a finding that Texas amounts to an "insurrectional or other movements," and
thus a subject of international law itself-would be internationally ascribed to the
United States of America.
203.
On this issue, see the fundamental considerations already in ROLANDO
QUADRI, DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE PUBBLICO 534-35 (5th ed. 1968).
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V. CONCLUSIONS

Hobbes suggested that "[b]efore the names of Just, and Unjust
can have place, there must be some coercive power."2 0 4 In fact, the
monopoly on the use of force within a certain territory is one of the
traditional ways through which entities have asserted themselves as
subjects of international law, although by no means the only one.
From the moment an entity is superiorem non recognoscens, discourse
on its rights, duties, and responsibilities under international law may
begin. It is submitted that this is the characterization that should be
applied in order to establish whether an entity is indeed a power, a
subject of international law, especially in dubious cases such as
internal disturbances developing into civil wars 20 5 and the case of alQaeda. 20 6 With regard to the latter, the U.S. government has recently
suggested that
there is an international armed conflict, but it is not just about the
Taliban and Afghanistan. . . . [Lit is about the international terrorist
organization Al Qaida. Al Qaida has conducted attacks across the globe.
• . . This is truly a global war against a determined, organized, and
207
capable enemy.
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THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 95 (J.C.A. Gaskin ed., Oxford Univ. Press
1998) (1651).
See Prosecutor v. Naletili6 and Martinovi6, Case No. IT-98-34-T, Judgment
205.
(ICTY 2003). The judgment states that the "Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna"
had de facto authority on a portion of Bosnia and Herzegovina for some time after April
10, 1992, and it waged an armed conflict with the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina
15-16, 25. Similarly, on June 16, 2004, Trial Chamber
controlled by Sarajevo. Id.
III of the same Tribunal found that the prosecution had adduced sufficient evidence
such that a trier of fact could reasonably conclude that there was an "armed conflict" in
Kosovo prior to March 24, 1999, thus implying that the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)
was an "organized armed group," a subject of international law. See Prosecutor v.
14Milogevi6, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Motion for Judgement of Acquittal,
40 (ICTY 2004).
On the background of al-Qaeda and its relations with the Taliban regime in
206.
Afghanistan, see Hirad Abtahi, From the Destruction of the Twin Buddhas to the
Destructionof the Twin Towers: Crimes Against Civilization under the ICC Statute, 4
INT'L CRIM. L. REV. 1, 3-7 (2004); U.S. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon
the United States, Overview of the Enemy (July 16, 2004), available at http://www.9llcommission.gov/hearings/hearingl2.htm (last visited Nov. 2004). Suggestions have
indeed been made that "Al Qaeda... has evolved into something like a virtual Islamist
state that is trying to find a permanent place for itself in the actual world .. "
Lawrence Wright, The Terror Web, NEW YORKER, Aug. 2, 2004, at 40, 53. The U.S.
Supreme Court has spoken of a mission of the United States Armed Forces to "subdue
al Qaeda." Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2635 (2004).
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United States v. Hicks, Prosecution Response to Defence Motion: Armed
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available at
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SUBJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Going back to the definition of "state" presented at the beginning
of this Article-the one enshrined in the Montevideo Convention and
substantially adopted by the Restatement-it is true that the three (or
four) elements may generally assist in the determination of whether a
certain entity is indeed a state. Not being a "state," however, does not
mean not being a "power" with all the rights and duties that, through
an empirical study, can be found to be applicable pursuant to
customary international law. For example, customary rules on
international responsibility should be deemed to apply to any "power"
regardless of whether all elements making up a state do exist in the
specific circumstances. 20 8 Fundamental rules on armed conflict would
also apply. 20 9 Moreover, general rules on non-interference in internal
affairs-except, of course, in cases of armed conflict-might be
applicable, as well. In this sense, U.S. court decisions relating to the
Civil War, 2 10 among others, show that states usually recognize
transactions in the ordinary course of civilian life (e.g., investments,
contracts, marriages) carried out under the laws of the subjects of
international law against whom they are fighting, insofar as they are
not closely related to the war effort. 2 11 Rules of international law
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Oct2004/d2O041026motion.pdf
2004).
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See Michael Schoiswohl, De Facto Regimes and Human Rights Obligations

- The Twilight Zone of Public InternationalLaw?, 6 AUSTRIAN REV. INT'L & EUR. L. 45,
85-90 (2001) (containing suggestions relating to international human rights
obligations).
See LINDSAY MOIR, THE LAW OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT 52-58 (2002).
209.
Moir states that insurgents are bound by Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions
of 1949 because the content of this article is now part and parcel of customary
international law. This would imply that customary international law regarding
armed conflict is automatically binding on all subjects able to wage an armed conflict.
See also supra notes 34, 44 (regarding the participation of the Holy See and of the
Sovereign Order of Malta to conventions and conferences related to the conduct of
The same conclusion seems to have been also implied when
hostilities).
Czechoslovakia was recognized as a winning power of the First World War. See supra,
notes 67-68 and accompanying text. The "conflict" between the U.S. and al-Qaeda is
improperly characterized as "international" by the prosecution in the case U.S. v.
Hicks, and one wonders whether the U.S. government has thoroughly considered the
possible consequences of such a qualification. See supra note 207 and accompanying
text. It is noteworthy, however, that even the characterization of the struggle as a
"conflict" lends support to the claim that al-Qaeda is indeed a subject of international
law, though not necessarily a state.
See supranotes 100-01 and accompanying text.
210.
This appears to be the application of that rule of international law which,
211.
according to certain scholars, mandates the recognition of "internal" acts of nonrecognized governments. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 205(3)
(1987); see also Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South
Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution
276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16, 125 (June 21); In re Al-Fin Corporation's Patent, [19701 Ch.
160, 177-81 (Apr. 2, 1969); Hopkins v. United Mexican States, 4 U.N. Rep. Int'l Arb.
Awards 41 (1926); PAUL GUGGENHEIM, REPERTOIRE SUISSE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC: DOCUMENTATION CONCERNANT LA PRACTIQUE DE LA CONF DgRATION EN
MATIftRE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC, 1914-1939 484-85 (1975) (reprinting the
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relating to territory and jurisdiction would only apply to subjects
212
enjoying effective control on portions of land.
In short, the presumption should be that state and non-state
actors enjoy, in principle, the same rights and duties; the distinction
between state and non-state actors remains important only because
states-in devising treaties to codify and further international
law-are fighting hard to maintain it. The international community is
a much more complex environment than many are ready to
acknowledge.

decision of June 4, 1926, by the Section of public law of the Swiss Federal Tribunal in
Schinz v. Tribunal Superior de Zurich).
212.
Thus, for example, when an IGO governs a portion of territory, rules of
customary international law relating to governing territory and population would
apply. See supra note 178 and accompanying text. When an entity does not have a
territory, rules pertaining, for example, to mail regulations are not applicable. See
supra note 44 and accompanying text.

